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This Article offers a new originalist account of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, with important implications for the Supreme Court’s pending decision on 
the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate.  In United 
States v. Comstock, the Supreme Court recently offered a substantial rethinking of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, for perhaps the first time since McCulloch v. 
Maryland.  Underlying the Court’s Comstock decision are two puzzles.  First, 
there is a puzzle on the surface of the opinion as to how to apply Justice Breyer’s 
novel five “considerations” in future cases, which this Article demonstrates has 
already left lower courts deeply confused, notably in the cases on the 
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act.  Second, Comstock brings back to 
the surface a deeper puzzle that has sat dormant in Necessary and Proper Clause 
jurisprudence from the beginning: the puzzle of what it really means for 
congressional legislation to be rationally related to an enumerated constitutional 
end.   
This Article seeks to solve both puzzles together by proposing a modern 
fiduciary theory of the Necessary and Proper Clause that provides meaning to 
Breyer’s considerations and clarifies the nature of a rational relation between 
legislated means and enumerated ends.  After canvassing the range of possible 
readings of Comstock and its means-end fit test, the Article draws on newly 
uncovered history of the fiduciary and agency law roots of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to argue that the means-end test that is the best reading of 
Comstock would ask whether Congress, in legislating, is acting as a proper 
fiduciary of the people of the United States, within the context of its enumerated 
powers.  Using the Affordable Care Act as a case study, the Article demonstrates 
that the modern fiduciary theory brings to bear a new and valuable toolset in 
interpreting the Act, and ultimately makes clear that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause should not pose a challenge to the law’s constitutionality.   
 
 
                                                 
1 J.D. Candidate, 2012, Yale Law School.  My sincere thanks to Heather Gerken for advising my 
work on this Article, and for all her very helpful comments along the way.  I would also like to 
thank Jack Balkin, Oona Hathaway, Daniel Hemel, and John Mikhail for their thoughtful 
comments and suggestions, and, finally, Miles Farmer, for sparking the conversation that led me 
to the idea for this Article.    
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For nearly two centuries, as battles were waged over clause after clause of 
the Constitution—the Commerce Clause invigorated (and cabined), the Due 
Process Clause substantiated (and unsubstantiated), the Equal Protection Clause 
applied to many a new suspect class—one crucial clause sat quietly unquestioned.  
The Necessary and Proper Clause, as every first-year constitutional law student 
learns, is simple.  In the famous words of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. 
Maryland: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, 
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which 
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are 
constitutional.”2 
 Yet, with little fanfare, the Supreme Court recently presented a substantial 
rethinking of the Necessary and Proper Clause, for perhaps the first time since 
McCulloch.  Suddenly, the Court offered five vague “considerations” that might 
form the basis of an entirely new test of what Congressional action is in fact 
“necessary and proper.”  (Or might not.)  Suddenly, Marshall’s elegant and simple 
test looked much more complex. 
 In United States v. Comstock,3 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
federal statute allowing a court to order civil commitment of “sexually 
dangerous” individuals beyond the date the prisoners would otherwise be released 
at the conclusion of their criminal sentences.  The Court justified this striking 
exercise of federal power by citing the Necessary and Proper Clause.  In support 
of his conclusion, Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, noted the breadth of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause; the long history of federal involvement in the 
relevant area; the sound reasons for the statute’s enactment; the statute’s 
accommodation of state interests; and the statute’s narrow scope.4  None of these 
considerations had previously been part of the test for constitutionality under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  Further, Justice Breyer rejected a one-step limit to 
the connection, under the Clause, between means of congressional legislation and 
enumerated constitutional ends.  
 The Court’s Comstock decision raises more questions than it answers: 
must all Breyer’s considerations be satisfied for a necessary and proper exercise 
of Congress’ authority?  Must any of them?  Are they really just “considerations” 
underlying one particular decision or do they constitute some form of new test?  If 
they do point to a new test, how should that test be applied in the innumerable 
other contexts in which Congress legislates?  And, however the five factors are 
weighed, what are the proper limits on the fit between legislated means and 
enumerated ends? 
                                                 
2 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
3 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). 
4 See, e.g., id. at 1965. 
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 This Article aims to begin answering these questions—which have 
garnered little attention to date5—and give content to the Comstock “test.”  
Fortunately, the time is particularly ripe for a reexamination of the application of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause in light of recent research on the history of the 
Clause by Gary Lawson, Geoffrey Miller, Robert Natelson, and Guy Seidman.6  
This Article will expand upon their historical conclusions to consider how best to 
provide meaning for Breyer’s test that is informed by the Clause’s original 
meaning.  The analysis will not, however, be purely originalist, in that it will 
apply original meaning to the contemporary Necessary and Proper Clause in a 
dynamic way, employing a kind of “living originalism.”7  Ultimately, the Article 
will propose a modern fiduciary theory of the Clause, and will thus contribute to 
growing appreciation of fiduciary models of law and democracy.8    
The analysis is also timely in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
to grant certiorari on the question of the constitutionality of the Patient Protection 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Revolution Next Time?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2010, 8:00 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/the-revolution-next-time/ (“The Comstock 
decision did not receive a great deal of public attention when it was issued.”).  Since Greenhouse’s 
observation, a few articles summarizing and offering limited commentary on the opinion have 
been published.  See, e.g., Tucker Culbertson, After Comstock: Equal Protection Challenges to the 
Civil Commitment Provisions of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 61 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 427 (2011); Garrick B. Pursley, Penal Deference and Other Oddities in United States v. 
Comstock, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y. 98 (2010); Ilya Shapiro & Trevor Burrus, Not 
Necessarily Proper: Comstock’s Errors and Limitations, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 413 (2011); Ilya 
Somin, Taking Stock of Comstock: The Necessary and Proper Clause and the Limits of Federal 
Power, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 239; see also Lauren Kulpa, Note, United States v. Comstock: 
The Next Chapter in the Struggle Between State and Congressional Power, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1145 (2011).  Commentary on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act also has begun to 
pick up on the case’s relevance.  See, e.g., Mark A. Harris, Commerce Clause Challenges to 
Health Care Reform, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1825 (2011); Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail 
Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1 (2011), 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/constitutional-law/bad-news-for-
mail-robbers:-the-obvious-constitutionality-of-health-care-reform/; Gary Lawson & David B. 
Kopel, Bad News for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental Unconstitutionality of the Individual 
Mandate, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 267 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-
pocket-part/supreme-court/bad-news-for-professor-koppelman:-the-incidental-unconstitutionality-
of-the-individual-mandate/. 
6 Of particular note is a recently published edited volume with contributions from these authors 
that provides the first book-length attempt at a comprehensive history of the clause.  GARY 
LAWSON ET AL., THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE (2010). 
7 See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).    
8 See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117 
(2006); Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 331 (2009); Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31 QUEEN’S L.J. 
259 (2005); Evan Fox-Decent & Evan J. Criddle, The Fiduciary Constitution of Human Rights, 15 
LEGAL THEORY 301 (2009); David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law’s Lessons for 
Deliberative Democracy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1249 (2011). 
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and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).9  After Comstock shook up the settled 
doctrine of the Clause, the debates on the constitutionality of the PPACA have 
drawn heavily on arguments about whether the law’s individual insurance 
mandate is a necessary and proper exercise of Congress’ power.10  Of course, the 
PPACA debates are but one of many disagreements on the constitutionality of a 
congressional exercise of legislative power likely to remain open until a clearer 
“necessary and proper” standard is reestablished. 
 This Article will proceed in four parts.  Part I will provide an overview of 
the Comstock decision and the reemergence of Necessary and Proper Clause 
jurisprudence that it engendered.  After briefly summarizing the history of the 
case, it will proceed to identify two puzzles arising from Breyer’s majority 
opinion.  First, it will consider Breyer’s five novel factors, and the puzzle of how 
these factors ought to be read moving forward.  Second, it will identify a deeper 
puzzle that has sat dormant in Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence from 
the beginning, but that Comstock brought back to the fore: the puzzle of what it 
really means for congressional legislation to be, in Chief Justice Marshall’s 
words, “plainly adapted” to an enumerated constitutional end.11  Part I will also 
summarize Justice Alito and Justice Kennedy’s concurrences, as well as Justice 
Thomas’ vigorous dissent, which, among other complaints, attacked Breyer’s 
opinion for precisely the vagueness this Article seeks to remedy. 
Part II will take a preliminary look at Necessary and Proper Clause 
jurisprudence since Comstock.  This Part will ask how lower courts have 
interpreted the limits of the Necessary and Proper Clause in authorizing 
congressional action, in light of Breyer’s opinion, including his five factors.  It 
will demonstrate that there is substantial confusion in the lower courts on the 
application of the majority’s test, and that the confusion has been especially 
manifest in the lower court opinions on the constitutionality of the PPACA.  It 
will also argue that some lower courts seem to be capitalizing on the vagueness of 
Breyer’s factors to justify whatever conclusion the judges may prefer. 
Part III will consider possibilities for curing the ambiguity inherent in the  
Comstock decision and bringing clarity to Necessary and Proper Clause 
jurisprudence, drawing on the history of the Clause and its interpretation.  It will 
                                                 
9 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119-1025 (2010). 
10 See, e.g., Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 
3519178 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011), cert. granted, 80 U.S.LW. 3198 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-
393), 80 U.S.L.W 3199 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-398), cert. granted in part, 2011 WL 
5515165 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-400); Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 
(6th Cir. 2011); Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 
1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. 
Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011). 
11 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
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start by returning to the roots of the Clause in corporate, administrative, and 
especially fiduciary law principles.  This historical analysis will indicate that 
“necessary” seems, at the time of the founding, to have been a reference to fit 
between a legislated means and an enumerated constitutional end, while 
“proper”—and particularly the “necessary and proper” construction as a whole—
followed a typical colonial agency law pattern referring to conformance with 
fiduciary norms expected of public officials.  This Part will also demonstrate that 
the Framers meant to incorporate this fiduciary vision in the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, and Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch implicitly drew on the 
very same principles.  
This historical backdrop will provide a starting point for informing a test 
that gives additional meaning and clarity to Justice Breyer’s Comstock approach, 
and ideally solves both the five-factor and the means-end fit puzzles of Breyer’s 
opinion.  Three basic possibilities might be envisioned.  A more aggressive 
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause after Comstock might apply a 
“rational basis with bite”-type analysis that suggests that the fit between legislated 
means and enumerated end must be a truly reasonable one for the congressional 
action to be constitutional.  On the other end of the spectrum, if Breyer’s factors 
are read only as vague considerations, it seems most any minimal fit between 
means and ends could suffice.  The Court has, in this reading, virtually 
“abandoned the field” of constraining Congress’ authority under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.  Finally, there may be a number of possible intermediate 
options.   
This Part suggests that the most appropriate such intermediate position 
would be one that is informed by the historical fiduciary principles on which the 
Necessary and Proper Clause is based.  In particular, this Article proposes the 
following means-ends test: is Congress acting as a proper fiduciary of the people 
of the United States, within the context of its enumerated powers? 
Part IV elaborates on this modern fiduciary theory of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, its benefits, and some potential challenges.  It concludes that the 
modern fiduciary theory offers both effective moderation between the two 
extremes of a test with too much “bite” and an empty test abandoning the field, 
and flexibility over time, while maintaining roots in the history of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.  The test therefore presents a robust and consistent way to fill 
the gaps in Necessary and Proper Clause interpretation left by Comstock’s 
ambiguities, clarifying the meaning of a reasonable fit between legislated means 
and enumerated ends and the way Breyer’s five factors ought to be understood.  
This theory is then tested in the case of the PPACA.  It is demonstrated that the 
modern fiduciary theory brings to bear a new and valuable toolset in interpreting 
the PPACA, making clear that—given Congress’ proper action as a fiduciary of 
the people of the United States in passing the legislation—the Necessary and 
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I. U.S. V. COMSTOCK AND THE REEMERGENCE OF THE NECESSARY AND 
PROPER CLAUSE  
 
In July 2006, President Bush signed into law the Adam Walsh Child 
Protection and Safety Act, a major statute aimed at fighting sexual exploitation of 
children.12  Senator Orrin Hatch described the law as the “most comprehensive 
child crimes and protection bill in our Nation's history.”13  Buried within the 
statute was a striking provision, § 4248, under which the Attorney General or his 
designee could certify an incarcerated individual as “sexually dangerous,” even if 
the individual had not been convicted of a sexual offense.14  Once so certified, the 
sexually dangerous individual could, at the Attorney General’s discretion, be 
civilly detained beyond his originally imposed criminal sentence, either in a 
federal facility, or, if the state in which the individual lived or was convicted was 
willing, a facility of that state.15 
 When the Adam Walsh Act was passed, Graydon Comstock was a few 
months away from the end of his federal prison sentence for receipt of child 
pornography.16  Soon after the statute passed, Comstock was designated a 
sexually dangerous individual and was set to be civilly detained beyond his 
scheduled release date.17  Comstock, and a number of similarly situated plaintiffs 
whose cases were consolidated, brought suit in the Eastern District of North 
Carolina, challenging the constitutionality of their continued detention.18  The 
district court sided with Comstock, finding that the civil commitment scheme was 
not sufficiently tied to any enumerated federal power to be justified, and was 
therefore an unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority.19  Judge Motz, 
writing for a unanimous Fourth Circuit panel, affirmed, holding that neither the 
                                                 
12 Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006). 
13 152 CONG. REC. 8012 (2006). 
14 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006). 
15 Id. § 4248(d).   
16 United States v. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 526 (E.D.N.C. 2007). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 527. 
19 See, e.g., id. at 559 (“Because the civil commitment scheme set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 4248 is not 
sufficiently tied to the exercise of any enumerated or otherwise identifiable constitutional power of 
Congress and because § 4248, as currently structured, is not a proper exercise of any power that 
Congress might constitutionally exercise, this court concludes that 18 U.S.C. § 4248 is 
unconstitutional.”). 
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Commerce Clause nor the Necessary and Proper Clause justified Congress’ 
passage of the civil commitment provision.20  
 As a circuit split emerged,21 the Supreme Court granted a writ of 
certiorari, and was thus faced with a rare head-on challenge to Congress’ 
authority to legislate under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Justice Breyer, 
writing for the Court, reversed the district court and the court of appeals with an 
opinion presenting a surprising rethinking of a Clause largely settled since 
McCulloch.22  The remainder of this Part will review the Supreme Court’s 
Comstock decision, including the two concurrences and Justice Thomas’ dissent.  
It will focus in particular on two puzzles emerging from the majority opinion, 
which must be solved in order to bring structure and consistency to Necessary and 
Proper Clause jurisprudence.   
 
A. The Majority’s Two Puzzles 
 
Justice Breyer’s opinion for the majority in Comstock is notable, first, for 
the novel five factors it laid out for evaluating whether the civil commitment 
provision that Congress passed in § 4248 of the Adam Walsh Act was in fact 
“necessary and proper” for carrying out an enumerated constitutional power.  
Whether and how to apply these factors in future cases is the first puzzle of 
Breyer’s opinion.  The opinion is, however, also notable for its conclusion that 
there is no inherent limit to the number of inferential “steps” “between an 
enumerated power and an Act of Congress,” but rather that only a rational basis is 
needed for the relationship between the enumerated power and the congressional 
act.23  This conclusion brings attention to a deeper, unresolved puzzle in 
                                                 
20 United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Supreme Court precedent thus 
compels the conclusion that § 4248 does not constitute a valid exercise by Congress of its 
Commerce Clause power.  To construe § 4248 as within such power would encroach on the police 
and parens patriae powers reserved to the sovereign states, conflating ‘what is truly national and 
what is truly local.’” (internal citation omitted)); id. (“What is less understandable is the 
Government's heavy reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause, standing alone, as a source of 
congressional power.  Of course, as the Government contends at length, the Necessary and Proper 
Clause reaches broadly, but it does so only to effectuate powers specifically enumerated in the 
Constitution.”); see also id. at 283 (“[T]he Government maintains that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause justifies § 4248 because it retains the ‘power to prosecute’ all persons in its custody 
charged with criminal offenses.  But the Government has already charged, tried, and convicted 
Comstock . . . of all alleged federal crimes; it retains no power to prosecute . . . .”). 
21 Compare Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, with United States v. Volungas, 593 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(upholding the constitutionality of § 4248, after cert was granted in Comstock), and United States 
v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 2009) (upholding the constitutionality of the statute between the 
filing of Comstock’s initial cert petition and his cert-stage reply brief). 
22 See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). 
23 Id. at 1964. 
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Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence: what exactly makes for a rational fit 
between legislated means and enumerated end?  This Section explores Breyer’s 
opinion and its two puzzles in detail, to set the stage for possible solutions.    
 
1. The New Puzzle: Breyer’s Five Factors 
 
In his opinion for the majority, Justice Breyer “ask[ed] . . . whether the  
Federal Government, exercising its enumerated powers, may enact such a statute 
[as § 4248],” and concluded that it could.24  The Court “base[d] this conclusion on 
five considerations, taken together.”25   
 First, the majority noted that “the Necessary and Proper Clause grants 
Congress broad authority to enact federal legislation,” citing to McCulloch, 
among other sources.26  The Court said Congress “possesses broad authority” to 
criminalize, imprison, and enact laws governing prisons and prisoners “in the 
course of ‘carrying into Execution’ the enumerated powers ‘vested by’ the 
‘Constitution in the Government of the United States’—authority granted by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.”27 
 Second, the Court considered that “the civil-commitment statute before us 
constitutes a modest addition” to the existing statutory scheme of “federal prison-
related mental health statutes that have existed for many decades.”  While the 
majority “recognized that even a longstanding history does not demonstrate a 
statute’s constitutionality,” it also noted (somewhat circularly) that such history 
could be helpful in determining “the reasonableness of the relation between the 
new statute and pre-existing federal interests.”28 
 Third, the Court indicated that § 4248 was based on sound reasons for 
enactment.  That is, the provision was deemed a reasonable exercise of the federal 
government’s role as custodian of its prisoners.29 
 Fourth, the majority considered the statute’s accounting for state interests, 
holding that it sufficiently preserved these interests, and posed no Tenth 
Amendment problem.30 
 Finally, fifth, the Court pointed to the narrowness of the statute’s scope 
and found that “the links between § 4248 and an enumerated Article I power 
[were] not too attenuated.”31   
                                                 
24 Id. at 1956. 
25 Id. 
26 See id. at 1956-57 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421). 
27 Id. at 1958 (internal citation omitted). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 1961. 
30 Id. at 1962. 
31 Id. at 1963. 
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Yet the majority said nothing about where these considerations came 
from.  They certainly were not understood, or cited, as existing considerations in 
Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence.32  Nor did the majority say what 
“taking together” these considerations really meant.  Rather, it left courts applying 
the Necessary and Proper Clause with a new puzzle as to whether the vague 
considerations were simply justifications for the particular decision in Comstock, 
or criteria to be applied in future cases.  If the latter, the opinion left further 
questions as to whether the considerations should be applied as a test, perhaps 
requiring all five, or at least most, of the factors to be met for legislation to be 
necessary and proper, or whether satisfying a couple of the criteria might be 
sufficient.33 
It is worth noting here at the outset that Justice Breyer’s general 
jurisprudential approach suggests the considerations were most likely meant to be 
considerations underlying the decision in Comstock itself, and not a rigorous new 
necessary and proper test to be applied consistently in future cases.  Justice Breyer 
has become well known for his pragmatism,34 which is expounded in the two 
books Breyer has written as a Justice, Active Liberty and Making Our Democracy 
Work.35  Breyer wrote in Active Liberty that a goal of judging should be “law that 
helps a community of individuals democratically find practical solutions to 
                                                 
32 See, e.g., Somin, supra note 5, at 248 (“[T]he decision cannot be defended on the basis of 
precedent, including Chief Justice John Marshall's landmark decision in M'Culloch v. 
Maryland.”). 
33 See id. at 244 (“Does the government still win if, say, only three of the five considerations 
support its position? If not, the five-part test significantly undercuts the pro-government 
implications of the Court's use of the rational basis test. . . .  Unfortunately, the Comstock Court 
says very little about how the five-part test should be applied to future cases.”); see also Pursley, 
supra, note 5, at 112-13 (“The majority did not provide a readily generalizable limitation on 
Congress’s power to legislate in furtherance of implied powers. The meaning of the five-factor test 
remains to be worked out.”). 
34 See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, The Pragmatic Passion of Stephen Breyer, 115 YALE L.J. 1675 (2006); 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Justice Breyer: Intentionalist, Pragmatist, Empiricist, 8 ADMIN. L.J. 747 
(1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer’s Democratic Pragmatism, 115 YALE L.J. 1719 (2006); 
Jeffrey Rosen, Op-Ed, Two Kinds of Pragmatist, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2005, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/oct/23/books/bk-rosen23. Justice Breyer’s academic work before 
ascending to the bench was also recognized for its pragmatism.  See Sunstein, supra, at 1719-20 
(“As a law professor at Harvard Law School, . . . .  [Breyer’s] important work in [administrative 
law] was marked above all by its unmistakably pragmatic foundations. In an influential book, 
Breyer emphasized that regulatory problems were ‘mismatched’ to regulatory tools; he urged that 
an understanding of the particular problem that justified regulation would help in the selection of 
the right tool.”). 
35 See generally STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW (2011); 
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2008). 
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important contemporary social problems.”36  For Breyer, judges should attempt to 
consider and balance all the relevant factors in a given case.37 
In addition, as Jeffrey Rosen has recognized, Justice Breyer’s pragmatism 
is a deferential one: “[f]or a modest justice with a sense of humility, such as 
Breyer, pragmatism seems, in most cases, a manifesto for judicial restraint.”38  In 
fact, contrary to the rhetoric of those deploring liberal “judicial activism,” 
multiple studies have found Justice Breyer to be the most deferential member of 
the Court, voting to overturn congressional statutes less often than any other 
Justice.39  In Active Liberty, Breyer noted that his interpretive tradition “calls for 
judicial restraint, basing that call upon both technical circumstance and 
democratic value.”40  Breyer’s thinking hearkens back to the blend of deference 
and pragmatism characteristic of Justices Brandeis and Holmes.41  Like them, 
                                                 
36 BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 35, at 12; see also id. at 19 (discussing Breyer’s 
understanding of the Framers’ commitment to “democratic principle[s] that would prove 
practically workable and that also, as a practical matter, would help protect individuals against 
oppression”). 
37 See id. at 109 (stating that Breyer’s interpretive tradition “hesitates to rely upon any single 
theory or grand view of law, of interpretation, or of the Constitution.”); see also Gewirtz, supra 
note 34, at 1677 (“[Breyer’s] opinions never rest on unitary principles . . . but invariably draw on 
multiple sources of meaning. He is not a case-at-a-time judge, but he is always engaged in the 
detailed particularity of specific cases, and in many ways his distinctive excellence is that he sees 
that particularity so clearly and can hold in place and attempt to balance the many factors that he 
sees at stake at particular moments of decision.”). 
38 Jeffrey Rosen, Op-Ed, Two Kinds of Pragmatist, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2005, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/oct/23/books/bk-rosen23 (contrasting Breyer’s deferential 
pragmatism with the less deferential pragmatism of Justice O’Connor). 
39 Lori A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of Voting Behavior on the 
Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 43, 49 (2007) (showing that Breyer cast the 
fewest votes to declare federal statutes unconstitutional on the Rehnquist Natural Court); see also 
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?  An Empirical 
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 826 (2006) (“Consider also a remarkable fact: 
Justice Breyer, the Court’s most vocal critic of a strong reading of Chevron, is the most deferential 
justice in practice . . . .”); id. at 831 (“Of the nine justices, Justice[] Breyer . . . [has] the highest 
validation rates, at 81.8 percent . . . .”); Paul Gewirtz & Chad Golder, Op-Ed., So Who Are the 
Activists?, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2005, at A23. 
40 BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 35, at 107; see also Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 1683 (“In 
cases such as United States v. Lopez, in which the Court has struck down congressional 
enactments as exceeding Congress's Commerce Clause powers, Breyer has emphasized the 
importance of deferring to Congress because of its plausible conclusions and comparative 
advantage in assessing social facts (the empirical detail of his dissent shows him writing in the 
tradition of Justice Brandeis), and because ‘the public has participated in the legislative process at 
the national level.’” (internal citation omitted)).  
41 Justice Breyer cited both Justices a number of times in Active Liberty, and he once gave the 
Brandeis Lecture at the University of Louisville School of Law, where he argued that Brandeis 
“was right in urging deference to legislative judgments, when economic regulation and ordinary 
social legislation is at issue. And he was right that we must continue to use facts and consequences 
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Breyer rarely meets a statute he thinks exceeds constitutional bounds, and for the 
same reasons: “reverence for experts, belief in majority rule, and the need to 
protect society from itself.”42 
After better understanding Breyer’s approach to constitutional 
interpretation, it seems clear that—in the civil commitment provision of the Adam 
Walsh Act—Justice Breyer saw a federal statute he thought made a sense, and 
was “necessary and proper” to address a pressing national problem.  He therefore 
wanted to find a practical way to defer to the democratically elected Congress’ 
decision to address that problem, within the bounds of the Constitution.  He did so 
via the opinion’s five considerations, weighing these relevant factors, and 
ultimately upholding the law under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Justice 
Breyer was almost certainly not, then, attempting to make things difficult for 
Congress by imposing a five-factor test, but, on the contrary, was looking for all 
the relevant reasons to uphold § 4248.  This inference at least gestures toward a 
solution to Comstock’s first puzzle.  Of course, the opinion itself is not so clear, 
hence the confusion over the five considerations in the lower courts considered in 
depth below.43 
 
2. The Enduring Puzzle: Means-End Fit 
 
Breyer’s discussion of the last Comstock consideration—narrowness of 
scope—was especially noteworthy in that, not only did it lay out a consideration 
that had not previously been explicitly applied, but it also repudiated a tenet of 
Necessary and Proper Clause theory that had been widely accepted and assumed 
by Comstock in his brief and at oral argument.44  The Court rejected Comstock’s 
                                                                                                                                     
to distinguish permissible, or better, from impermissible or worse, interpretations of the 
Constitution and of law.”  Stephen Breyer, Brandeis Lecture: Justice Brandeis as Legal Seer (Feb. 
16, 2004), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_02-16-
04.html. 
42 David E. Bernstein & Josh Blackman, Op-Ed, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer Shows 
Progressive Streak, STAR-LEDGER, July 12, 2011, 
http://blog.nj.com/njv_guest_blog/2011/07/supreme_court_justice_stephen.html. 
43 See infra Part II. 
44 See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 26, United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) (No. 
08-1224) (“[T]he Necessary and Proper Clause does not demand a nexus to federal ‘interests,’ 
‘connections’ or ‘special relationships’; it demands a nexus to an enumerated power.”); id. at 22 
(distinguishing situations in which “[a] clear and unbroken connection exists between these 
aspects of the criminal justice system and the enumerated power” from the § 4248 situation); 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) (No. 08-
1224) (distinguishing Comstock’s situation from that of someone not guilty by reason of insanity 
because “the commitment that flows from a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict is directly 
linked to the Federal law which brought you into custody in the first place. . . . . [s]o there’s a 
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argument that “Congress’ authority can be no more than one step removed from a 
specifically enumerated power,” despite the Court’s assertion in United States v. 
Lopez that it “may not ‘pile inference upon inference’ in order to sustain 
congressional action under Article I.”45  Instead, citing McCulloch, and other 
precedent including Greenwood v. United States, a prior case upholding the 
constitutionality of a federal civil commitment scheme,46 and Sabri v. United 
States, a more recent decision upholding legislation on Necessary and Proper 
Clause grounds,47 the majority held that there was no categorical rule limiting 
Congress to one inferential step from an enumerated power in passage of 
legislation.   
All that was required seemed to be a rational relationship between the 
legislated means and some end enumerated in the Constitution.48  As Ilya Somin 
has indicated, this poses a serious problem if the Court’s logic is taken to an 
extreme: “[T]hen the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the power to 
enact any law that might be connected to an ancillary power that is in turn 
somehow connected to an enumerated power, even if the challenged law does not 
actually do anything to enforce any enumerated power.”49   
This predicament gets at the second puzzle of the Comstock majority 
opinion: if not a requirement of a direct connection between legislated means and 
enumerated end, what exactly is a “rational” means-end fit under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause?  This question is not a new one—it is simmering below the 
surface in cases from McCulloch through Greenwood and Sabri—but it is one that 
has never been fully answered.  And, having deeper roots than the single 
Comstock opinion, it is a puzzle that (unlike the five factors puzzle) cannot be 
                                                                                                                                     
direct link between the—the crime which brought you into Federal custody and your subsequent 
commitment.”).  
45 130 S. Ct. at 1963 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995)).  
46 350 U.S. 366 (1956) (upholding a statute evidently more than one-step removed from the 
constitutional power to “establish post offices and post roads”); see also 130 S. Ct. at 1963. 
47 541 U.S. 600 (2004).  In this case, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute making it a 
federal crime to bribe officials of non-federal organizations distributing federal funds, which was 
based on a power seemingly more than one step removed from the Spending Clause.  See id. at 
604-07; see also Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1964.  The Sabri Court indicated that “means-end 
rationality” in the relationship between the legislation and the Spending Clause was sufficient 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  541 U.S. at 605. 
48 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956 (“[I]n determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause 
grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular federal statute, we look to see 
whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a 
constitutionally enumerated power.”). 
49 Somin, supra note 5, at 253; see also id. at 254 (“In sum, under the majority's reasoning in 
Comstock, Congress would have almost as much authority as it currently has even if the 
Constitution gave Congress only two enumerated powers: the power to regulate interstate 
commerce and the Necessary and Proper Clause itself.”). 
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addressed simply by looking to external indicators of Justice Breyer’s 
jurisprudential approach.  Much of the remainder of this paper will therefore be 
devoted to solving this deeper puzzle.  
 
B. Two Concurrences 
 
While Justice Breyer’s conclusion in Comstock garnered seven of the nine  
Justices’ votes, Justices Kennedy and Alito each concurred only in the judgment, 
and questioned aspects of Breyer’s reinterpretation of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.   
 Justice Alito explained that he was “concerned about the breath of the 
Court’s language, and the ambiguity of the standard that the Court applies,” 
though he “was persuaded, on narrow grounds, that it was ‘necessary and proper’ 
for Congress to enact the statute at issue in this case . . . in order to ‘carry into 
Execution’ powers specifically conferred on Congress by the Constitution.”50  In 
Alito’s view, § 4248 carries into execution “the enumerated powers that support 
the federal criminal statutes under which the affected prisoners were convicted.”51  
Perhaps most noteworthy about this explanation is that Justice Alito seems to 
embrace the majority’s assumption that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not 
require a one-step limit to the separation between an enumerated power and a 
“necessary and proper” exercise of Congress’ legislative power.  Instead, § 4248 
can be necessary to the federal criminal statutes that are, in turn, necessary and 
proper to Congress’ enumerated powers.52  What is required, and what is present 
for § 4248, Alito suggests, is simply “an ‘appropriate’ link between a power 
conferred by the Constitution and the law enacted by Congress.”53  
Agreeing with the majority’s basic conclusion, Justice Kennedy concurred 
separately to note that the majority’s “rational basis” necessary and proper test 
“must be employed with care.”54  Kennedy wished to assure the test in this 
context was not confused with the distinct (and less exacting) rational basis test 
applied, for instance, in the due process context, and that the test was applied with 
due regard for federalism principles.55 
                                                 
50 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1968-69 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal citations 
omitted). 
51 Id. at 1969. 
52 See id. (“In other words, most federal criminal statutes rest upon a congressional judgment that, 
in order to execute one or more of the powers conferred on Congress, it is necessary and proper to 
criminalize certain conduct, and in order to do that it is obviously necessary and proper to provide 
for the operation of a federal criminal justice system and a federal prison system.”). 
53 Id. at 1970. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1966-68. 
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 But Justice Kennedy was even more explicit in his concurrence than 
Justice Alito that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not require a one-step 
link between an enumerated power and a given legislative act.  “Respondents 
argue that congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause can be 
no more than one step removed from an enumerated power.  This is incorrect.”56  
As Kennedy explains, “[w]hen the inquiry is whether a federal law has sufficient 
links to an enumerated power to be within the scope of federal authority, the 
analysis depends not on the number of links in the congressional-power chain but 
on the strength of the chain.”57  Thus, at least seven Justices agreed on some form 
of flexible—though not unconstrained—rational-basis-type necessary and proper 
standard.     
  
C. Thomas’ Dissent 
 
That leaves two Justices who dissented from the majority’s Comstock 
result.  Justice Thomas wrote the dissent, and Justice Scalia joined most of it, but, 
notably, chose not to join the section in which Justice Thomas questioned the 
majority’s rational basis approach to the Necessary and Proper Clause and argued 
that “the Clause plainly requires a showing that every federal statute ‘carries into 
Execution’ one or more of the Federal Government’s enumerated powers.”58  
While Justice Scalia did not write separately to clarify his concerns, his 
unwillingness to join the section of Justice Thomas’ opinion requiring a 
rigorously direct connection between an enumerated power and a given 
congressional act suggests that, like all the Justices in the majority, he too 
recognized flexibility in Congress’ authority under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. 
 Where Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas did agree was, first, that § 4248 
went too far.  Second, the two agreed on a concern shared, at least to some 
substantial degree, by Justices Alito and Kennedy, that the novelty and ambiguity 
of Justice Breyer’s five considerations—the first puzzle of Comstock—was bound 
to cause problems.  Thomas argued that “[t]he Court’s newly minted test cannot 
be reconciled with the Clause’s plain text or with two centuries of our precedent 
interpreting it.”59  Moreover, Thomas highlighted the amorphousness of the 
considerations: 
 
Must each of the five considerations exist before the Court sustains future 
                                                 
56 Id. at 1965-66 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
57 Id. at 1966. 
58 Id. at 1976 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
59 Id. at 1974-75. 
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federal legislation as proper exercises of Congress’ Necessary and Proper 
Clause authority?  What if the facts of a given case support a finding of 
only four considerations?  Or three?  And if three or four will suffice, 
which three or four are imperative?  The Court provides no answers to 
these questions.60  
 
Justice Thomas’ worry has already proved prescient as lower courts 
struggling to apply the Comstock approach in other cases have faced substantial 
confusion.  The following Part will explore this emerging confusion, which makes 
greater clarity as to the future of the Necessary and Proper Clause crucial. 
 
 
II. THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE IN DISARRAY 
 
The many unanswered questions left in the Comstock majority’s approach, 
particularly as to the application of the opinion’s five considerations, have baffled 
lower courts attempting to move forward in interpreting the Necessary and Proper 
Clause’s limits, both in cases related to Comstock, and cases in entirely different 
substantive areas of law.  Among the most notable of these post-Comstock cases 
are those on the constitutionality of the PPACA.  Most troublingly, in some of 
these cases, courts seem to be capitalizing on Comstock’s ambiguities—whether 
intentionally or not—to interpret the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
meet their own needs, at times contributing to inconsistent outcomes across cases. 
 
A. Sex Offender Cases and Beyond 
 
Because cases requiring courts to rule on the constitutionality of 
congressional statutes are rare, there have been few lower court decisions 
applying Comstock to date;61 but those that have are cause for some concern.  
                                                 
60 Id. at 1975. 
61 Aside from the SORNA cases discussed at length in this Section and the health care law cases 
discussed in the following Section, another lower court case that applied Comstock in some detail 
is United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 804, 808 (11th Cir. 2010) (upholding the 
constitutionality under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Torture Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2340-
2340A (2006), which implements the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85); see also id. at 805 
(“Congressional power to pass those laws that are necessary and proper to effectuate the 
enumerated powers of the Constitution is nowhere broader and more important than in the realm 
of foreign relations.”).  There have not yet been any Supreme Court decisions applying the 
Comstock approach, though Justice Kennedy’s concurrence was cited by Justice Stevens in his 
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Cases interpreting a different provision of the same statute at issue in Comstock, 
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) (i.e., Title I of the 
Adam Walsh Act),62 provide a good example.   
 In United States v. Kebodeaux, the Fifth Circuit panel upheld the 
constitutionality of the SORNA provision enforcing the requirement that federal 
sex offenders register intrastate relocation.63  The Kebodeaux court listed all five 
of Comstock’s factors, and asserted that “[t]hese factors implement the notion that 
Congress may pass laws rationally related or reasonably adapted to the 
effectuation of enumerated powers.”64  Then, with virtually no analysis, the court 
held that, “[r]eviewing the Comstock factors in light of the Court’s analysis, we 
conclude that the SORNA registration requirement for registration of federal sex 
offenders is rationally related to the original goals of the criminal statutes under 
which persons such as Kebodeaux were convicted.”65   
 Judge Dennis concurred in a separate opinion, in which he faulted the 
majority for its misapplication of Comstock.66  Judge Dennis explained: “I believe 
that the majority has fallen into serious error in reading Comstock to arrogate vast 
revisionary powers to judges, allowing them to uphold as necessary and proper 
any piece of legislation, regardless of the vehicle by which Congress enacted it, so 
long as the judges can in retrospect see a rational relationship between that law 
and some enumerated power.”67   
Given the disagreement between the majority and Judge Dennis’s 
concurrence, the Fifth Circuit panel agreed to rehear the case and issued a new 
opinion.68  This time the majority: 
 
[Noted] at the outset that [Comstock’s] ‘considerations’ are not factors to 
be balanced or that may cut for or against the constitutionality of a statute 
but rather an articulation of every reason supporting the Court’s 
conclusion that the civil commitment at issue in Comstock was 
constitutional.  Comstock does not require that every one of these 
considerations be present in every case, nor does Comstock in any respect 
                                                                                                                                     
dissent in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 3025, 3093 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“The Constitution . . . still allocates a general ‘police power . . . to the States and the States alone  
. . . .’” (citing Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)).  
62 Pub. L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006).  
63 634 F.3d 293, 294 (5th Cir. 2011) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(A)), superceded by 647 
F.3d 137 (5th Cir 2011), reh’g en banc granted, 647 F.3d 605 (5th Cir. 2011) 
64 634 F.3d at 297. 
65 Id. at 298. 
66 Id. at 304-05 (Dennis, J., concurring). 
67 Id. at 304-05. 
68 United States v. Kebodeaux, 647 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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purport to overrule the Court’s prior decisional law.69 
 
The court nevertheless went on to show how the Comstock considerations 
weighed in favor of upholding the provision at issue in Kebodeaux.70  Judge 
Dennis, meanwhile, maintained his separate opinion,71 and, with the continued 
disagreement and confusion, the Fifth Circuit recently agreed to rehear the case en 
banc.72    
 Like Judge Dennis, the majority in a Tenth Circuit case ruling on the 
constitutionality of the SORNA provision at issue in Kebodeaux also applied 
Comstock differently than the Kebodeaux majority.  In United States v. 
Yelloweagle, the Tenth Circuit, like the Fifth Circuit, upheld the constitutionality 
of the SORNA registration enforcement provision under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.73  But the Yelloweagle court did not consider any of the five Comstock 
factors explicitly.74  Instead, the court simply noted that Comstock required that 
congressional statutes “constitute a means that is rationally related to the 
implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power,” in order to be 
“necessary and proper.”75  It then held that the SORNA provision at issue 
constituted such a means because “[i]t seems beyond peradventure that the 
criminal enforcement provision of § 2250(a)(2)(A) is ‘rationally related or 
reasonably adapted to the effectuation’ of the sex offender registration regime,”76 
in turn a proper exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power.77 
While the two circuits that have addressed the constitutionality of this 
SORNA provision under the Necessary and Proper Clause so far came to the 
same conclusion, despite their differing applications of Comstock’s amorphous 
considerations, the lower courts applying Comstock in the critically important 
PPACA context have had less consistent outcomes. 
 
                                                 
69 Id. at 142. 
70 See id. at 142-46. 
71 Id. at 146-56. 
72 United States v. Kebodeaux, 647 F.3d 605 (5th Cir. 2011) (granting rehearing en banc). 
73 643 F.3d 1275, 1277 (10th Cir. 2011). 
74 A different Tenth Circuit panel has since noted its interpretation that: “[a]lthough the Court 
referenced these considerations, it did not suggest that they should be balanced or considered in 
every Necessary and Proper Clause analysis.  Rather, the five considerations appear to be an 
articulation of the reasons that supported the Court’s conclusion that the statute at issue was 
constitutional.”  United States v. Carel, No. 10-1095, slip op. at 19 n.8 (10th Cir. Dec. 30, 2011) 
(citations omitted). 
75 643 F.3d at 1285. 
76 Id. at 1288 (quoting United States v. Kebodeaux, 634 F.3d 293, 297 (5th Cir. 2011)). 
77 See Yelloweagle, 643 F.3d at 1286. 
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B. The Affordable Care Act Cases 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in November 2011 to settle the 
inconsistent decisions in the lower courts on the constitutionality of the PPACA, 
and particularly its so-called individual mandate, imposing a fee for failure to 
purchase health insurance. Four courts of appeals have heard cases on the 
constitutionality of the mandate, with the Sixth78 and D.C. Circuits79 upholding 
the mandate on the merits, the Eleventh Circuit finding it unconstitutional (but 
also severable from the constitutional act as a whole),80 and the Fourth Circuit 
finding two separate challenges to be jurisdictionally barred.81 
 Some of these decisions, and the district court decisions on the same 
question, considered whether the individual mandate is  “necessary and proper” at 
some length, often discussing Comstock.  Some focused on other grounds for their 
decisions, like the Commerce Clause,82 the Taxing Clause, or jurisdictional bars, 
and largely or entirely avoided explicit reference to the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  What is clear in the decisions is that those finding the mandate 
unconstitutional have tended to spend substantial energy distinguishing 
Comstock,83 while the other cases, including those upholding the mandate, have 
tended to bypass the necessary and proper issue.84   
                                                 
78 Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011). 
79 Seven-Sky v. Holder, No. 11-5047, 2011 WL 5378319 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 8, 2011). 
80 Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert granted, 
80 U.S.LW. 3198 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-393), 80 U.S.L.W 3199 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 
11-398), cert, granted in part, 2011 WL 5515165 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-400). 
81 Liberty University v. Geithner, No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) 
(vacating and remanding with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, as a result of the 
Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006)); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 653 F.3d 
253 (4th Cir. 2011) (vacating and remanding with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing). 
82 It is worth noting that Commerce Clause jurisprudence often conflates Necessary and Proper 
Clause analysis, particularly because the “substantial effects” test under the Commerce Clause is 
in at least some sense a test of how necessary and proper a given legislative act is to the 
Commerce Power.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring)  
(“Congress’s regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate 
commerce (including activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives from 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.”). 
83 See Florida, 648 F.3d 1235, at 1279-82, 1302-04 (11th Cir. 2011); Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1295-97 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part sub nom. Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 
2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 778-82 (E.D. Va. 2010), 
vacated on other grounds, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011). 
84 See Seven-Sky v. Holder, No. 11-5047, 2011 WL 5378319, at *2, 9 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 8, 2011) 
(failing to cite Comstock or provide any extended analysis of the Necessary and Proper Clause); 
Liberty University v. Geithner, No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915, at *45 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) 
(failing to mention Comstock or the Necessary and Proper Clause, except in passing in Judge 
Davis’ dissent); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 653 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (failing to 
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 In the Eleventh Circuit, for example, the majority, which struck down the 
individual mandate, noted that the Comstock “majority opinion enumerated five 
‘considerations’ that supported the statute’s constitutional validity,” and 
proceeded to discuss how all five were met in Comstock.85  The Eleventh Circuit 
presented these factors as a kind of test, and later suggested that failure to satisfy 
all the factors put the constitutionality of the individual mandate in doubt.86  The 
court focused on the fact that the individual mandate was a subject of traditional 
state concern, implicating “three of the five Comstock factors pertinent to a 
Necessary and Proper Clause analysis: (1) whether there is a long history of 
federal involvement in this arena, (2) whether the statute accommodates or 
supplants state interests, and (3) the statute's narrow scope.”87   
The district court opinion in the case also applied Comstock’s factors.  The 
court explained: 
 
To the extent that [the factors] constitute a ‘test,’ the individual mandate 
clearly gets a failing score on at least two (and possibly a couple more) of 
the five elements.  A statute mandating that everyone purchase a product 
from a private company or be penalized . . . is not a ‘modest’ addition to 
federal involvement in the national health care market, nor is it ‘narrow 
[in] scope.88 
 
                                                                                                                                     
mention Comstock or the Necessary and Proper Clause at all); Thomas More Law Center v. 
Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 554, 564, 570 n.2 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Comstock only in passing in Judge 
Sutton’s concurrence, and the Necessary and Proper Clause only in passing in the majority opinion 
and in a footnote in Judge Graham’s concurrence); Liberty University v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 
611, 630 (W.D. Va. 2010) (“Because I find that the employer and individual coverage provisions 
are within Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause, it is unnecessary to consider whether 
the provisions would be constitutional exercises of power pursuant to . . . the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.”), vacated on other grounds, 656 F.3d 253; Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 
720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (failing to mention Comstock or the Necessary and Proper 
Clause), aff’d, 651 F.3d 529.  But see Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 34-35 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(discussing the Necessary and Proper Clause, including Comstock, at some length, and holding 
that the individual mandate did not contravene the Necessary and Proper Clause), aff’d, sub nom. 
Seven-Sky v. Holder, 2011 WL 5378319. 
85 Florida, 648 F.3d at 1279-82. 
86 See id. at 1306 (“[I]t is undisputed that the individual mandate supersedes a multitude of the 
states’ policy choices in these key areas of traditional state concern. Congress’s encroachment 
upon these areas of traditional state concern is yet another factor that weighs in the plaintiffs’ 
favor, and strengthens the inference that the individual mandate exceeds constitutional 
boundaries.”). 
87 Id. at 1304. 
88 Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1295. 
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The court went on to assume “that the Comstock ‘considerations’ were just that,” 
i.e., considerations and not a test per se,89 but used the considerations to find in 
the end that the individual mandate “cannot be reconciled with a limited 
government of enumerated powers” and thus was unconstitutional under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.90 
 Judge Marcus’ dissent in the Eleventh Circuit took a different approach.  
Instead of emphasizing the ambiguity of the Comstock “test,” and the factors on 
which the individual mandate might rest on shaky ground, Judge Marcus 
discussed Comstock only in the context of affirming means-ends rationality as the 
one critical test of constitutionality under the Necessary and Proper Clause, and 
underlining the “expansive definition of ‘necessary’” reiterated in Comstock.91  
Similarly, the lower court majority opinions upholding the individual mandate 
also have tended to emphasize only Comstock’s rational basis test, rather than the 
five factors, to the extent they consider the case, and Necessary and Proper Clause 
analysis, at all.92  
 In some sense, it may seem counterintuitive that the opinions upholding 
the individual mandate have tended to avoid the Comstock considerations, while 
those finding the mandate unconstitutional have relied on them heavily.  After all, 
Justice Breyer used the considerations to uphold the civil commitment provision 
at issue in Comstock, and his generally deferential and pragmatic approach 
suggests he meant for the considerations to be used flexibly.93  But because the 
way the Comstock factors are to be applied, and whether they ultimately make the 
McCulloch test more or less stringent, is not entirely evident from the opinion 
itself, courts looking to uphold a provision like the individual mandate that may 
rest on shaky ground with respect to at least some of the Comstock factors,94 
                                                 
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 1298. 
91 Florida, 648 F.3d at 1349 (Marcus, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)  (“‘[T]he 
relevant inquiry is simply whether the means chosen are reasonably adapted to the attainment of a 
legitimate end under the commerce power . . . .’  And the mandate is undoubtedly ‘rationally 
related’ to the end of effectuating the Act’s guaranteed issue and community rating reforms.” 
(quoting United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010))). 
92 See, e.g., Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 564 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., 
concurring) (“The courts . . . require only an ‘appropriate’ or ‘reasonable’ ‘fit’ between means and 
ends.” (citing United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956-57 (2010))); see also supra note 
84 and accompanying text.  It is worth noting that the D.C. district court opinion upholding the 
individual mandate, which considered Comstock in significantly more detail than other decisions 
upholding the mandate, still did not discuss the five factors.  See Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 
16, 34-35 (D.D.C. 2011).     
93 See supra Subsection II.a.ii. 
94 See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text; see also Shapiro & Burris, supra note 5, at 423-
24 (“Looking at the five considerations offered by the Comstock majority, it is not at all clear that 
the case favors the government’s defense of Obamacare. . . .  [T]he first factor is essentially 
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might well avoid relying on these factors, and instead focus on, for instance, the 
opinion’s looser rational basis test.  (And so they have.95)  Meanwhile, courts 
looking to strike down a provision like the individual mandate might well draw 
heavily on the factors as constraints.  (And so they have, too.)   
In short, the lower courts, whether knowingly or not, seem to be exploiting 
Comstock’s uncertainties to meet their own needs.  Thus, the opinion’s 
ambiguities are contributing to inconsistent interpretations across the lower 
courts.  And they will likely continue to do so with respect to the constitutionality 
of future federal laws until the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause after 
Comstock finally becomes clear.   
 
 
III. FIXING THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE AFTER COMSTOCK 
 
In order to bring clarity to the Necessary and Proper Clause after 
Comstock, this Part first returns to history.  It draws on new research on the 
origins and structure of the Clause in fiduciary and agency law to consider what 
                                                                                                                                     
irrelevant; while Comstock and other cases have already established that Congress’s powers under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause are broad, whether they are so broad as to encompass the 
individual mandate is the very question at issue. Comstock’s second consideration—a history of 
federal regulation in the area—does not clearly weigh to either side. . . .  The third factor—
whether Congress had ‘sound reasons’ for enacting the mandate—is at the very least debatable.     
. . .  Factors four and five—the accommodation of state interests and the narrow scope of the 
law—are also exceedingly difficult for Obamacare to satisfy.” (internal citations omitted)). 
95 Interestingly, the Obama Administration—perhaps fearing that the factors could be read against 
them—also has not relied on the Comstock considerations in its briefing in support of the PPACA, 
though it has cited in passing to other, more obviously deferential statements from Comstock.  See, 
e.g., Brief for Respondent, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, No. 11-420, petition for cert. 
filed Sept. 30, 2011 (avoiding any citation to Comstock); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14, 16, 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398 (filed Sept. 28, 2011) (citing Comstock 
only for the propositions that “the Constitution’s grants of specific federal legislative authority are 
accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are ‘convenient, or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the 
authority’s ‘beneficial exercise’” and that the choice of rational means for carrying out an 
enumerated end is left primarily to Congress); Brief for Respondents, Thomas More Law Center 
v. Obama, No. 11-117, petition for cert. filed July 26, 2011 (citing Comstock only for its assertion 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants “broad power to enact laws that are ‘convenient, or 
useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise’” and that there is a “‘presumption of 
constitutionality’ . . . ‘when examining the scope of Congressional power’”); see also Shapiro & 
Burris, supra note 5, at 422 (“[T]he government has been citing Comstock in its briefs defending 
the legislation against legal challenge.  It is initially telling, however, that the case has merited 
little more than a passing mention in this briefing.  Comstock is simply not a case that the 
government is hanging its hat on . . . .”).  This may be part of the reason the courts in which the 
Administration has won the day have not themselves relied heavily on Comstock. 
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“necessary and proper” meant to the Framers, as well as John Marshall in 
McCulloch, and what it should be understood to mean moving forward.   
The remainder of this Part uses the history, and the earlier analysis of 
Comstock and the confusion it has engendered, to evaluate three possible readings 
of the Necessary and Proper Clause after Comstock.  On the side of more 
aggressive judicial enforcement might be a “rational basis with bite”-type test, 
while, on the other end of the spectrum, Comstock might be read to move toward 
abandonment of the field of judicial enforcement of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  Yet, this Article will ultimately argue that an intermediate position, 
closely tailored to the history laid out in this Part—a modern fiduciary theory of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause—is the most natural reading of the Clause after 
Comstock.           
 
A. Back to Basics: History of the Clause 
 
Perhaps in substantial part because the jurisprudence around the Clause 
was long viewed as settled, the Necessary and Proper Clause has not been the 
subject of copious historical analysis.  The Clause, which was the subject of 
virtually no (recorded) discussion at the Philadelphia Convention,96 was labeled 
by one constitutional scholar “a masterpiece of enigmatic formulations,”97 and 
was long considered, for the most part, a “mystery.”98  But Gary Lawson, 
Geoffrey Miller, Robert Natelson, and Guy Seidman recently published a volume 
arguing that there may be another good reason so little was known about the 
Necessary and Proper Clause before: historians were looking in all the wrong 
places.99  Rather than in the debates among the Framers, the real roots of the 
Clause lie deeper, in background principles of agency, administrative, and 
corporate law that “infused” the Framers worldviews, but are not typically looked 
to by constitutional scholars or judges.100   
This Section explores this latest research on the origins of the Clause, but 
with an eye toward a goal Lawson and his co-authors have explicitly avoided101: 
                                                 
96 See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 183, 185 (2003). 
97 Mark A. Graber, Unnecessary and Unintelligible, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 167, 168 (1995). 
98 LAWSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 2. 
99 Id. at 5. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 8 (“There is enough convergence to permit reasonably confident assertions about the 
clause’s actual origins.  An obvious next question is whether there is enough convergence to 
support a general theory of the clause’s actual meaning.  Although that may be an obvious next 
question, it is not one this book seeks to pursue. . . .  We fervently wish to elide those kinds of 
broad issues in this book—if only because the authors do not necessarily agree about interpretive 
methodology.”).  
Modern Fiduciary Theory 
 
 
    24
applying the history to move toward a general theory of the meaning of the 
Clause, particularly in the wake of Comstock.   
 
3. Roots in Fiduciary and Agency Law 
 
Chief Justice Marshall famously exhorted in McCulloch: “we must never 
forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.”102  The claim, like the 
Necessary and Proper Clause itself, might seem—in some sense—enigmatic: we 
must never forget it is a constitution . . . as opposed to what?  But recent research 
suggests an obvious contrast: a corporate charter, a small-scale, Constitution-like 
document that would have been eminently familiar to Marshall and the rest of the 
Framers.103   
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when corporations were 
quasi-public entities performing largely public tasks, corporate charters tended to 
define specific powers and responsibilities, rather than offering general 
authorization to do business.104  Geoffrey Miller’s extensive study of these 
charters has demonstrated that terms like “necessary,” “proper,” and “necessary 
and proper” were commonplace in the charters.105  And their use often paralleled 
the use of the terms in the Constitution, to allow for extension of enumerated 
rules,106 while limiting the discretion of the corporate officers to actions needed to 
carry out those rules.107  The terms used to describe the granted scope of authority 
varied, but “necessary” and “proper” were the most common, and doublets like 
“necessary and proper” were also typical.108  Miller argues that such doublets 
could be read as redundant, since necessary exercises of authority would seem to 
                                                 
102 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
103 See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Corporate Law Background of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
in LAWSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 144, 175. 
104 LAWSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 7. 
105 Miller, supra note 103, at 145. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 150. 
108 Id. at 152-54.  Among other common scope terms seen in the charters studied by Miller were 
“expedient,” “fit,” “convenient,” “at pleasure,” and “appertaining,” while other common doublets 
included “expedient and necessary,” “fit and expedient,” “necessary and convenient,” “fit and 
proper,” “suitable and necessary,” and “necessary or convenient.”  Id.  Interestingly, the doublets 
consistently included both a term suggesting firm limits to a grant of authority, like “necessary,” 
and maybe “fit” (though Samuel Johnson’s dictionary listed “fit” as a synonym of proper, see 2 
SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1785)); and a term suggesting more 
discretionary appropriateness limits like “proper,” “expedient,” “suitable,” and “convenient.”  See 
also Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in LAWSON ET 
AL., supra note 6, at 68-80 (describing five “formulas” of necessary and proper-like constructions 
in eighteenth century documents conveying authority). 
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be a subset of proper ones.109  But he concludes that, while “necessary” suggests 
the need for a fit between ends enumerated in the charter and means chosen to 
carry them out, “proper” might have expressed separately, at least rhetorically, the 
idea that officers should act “so as to consider the effect on stakeholders in the 
firm.”110  As applied to the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause, this may 
suggest that the Clause should be read to require both means-ends fit and 
consideration of propriety of lawmaking for individual citizens.111 
This conclusion is broadly consistent with the independent conclusions of 
Robert Natelson, studying the “necessary and proper” concept in the eighteenth 
century private law of agency,112 and Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, studying 
the pre-constitutional British and colonial administrative law background.113  
Together, all three lines of research point to what they call “public agency law” 
roots for the Necessary and Proper Clause, linked to fiduciary principles.114   
Lawson and Seidman focus on the administrative law principle of 
“reasonableness”—or, as it might also, perhaps more precisely, be termed, “the 
principle of fiduciary public agency”—in British and colonial administrative 
law.115  That principle, which was well established by the eighteenth century and 
would therefore have been very familiar to the Framers (many of whom were, of 
course, lawyers116), requires delegations of authority “to be exercised with 
impartiality, efficacy, proportionality, and regard for people’s rights.”117  The 
“necessary and proper” construction, in turn, explicitly codifies these very 
principles.118  “Necessary” reflects efficacy and proportionality limits; while 
“proper” suggests impartiality, regard for rights, and fiduciary principles 
broadly.119   
                                                 
109 Miller, supra note 103, at 159. 
110 Id. at 174-75. 
111 See id.  
112 This work was first published in Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 243 (2004), and adapted and expanded upon in 
chapters 4 and 5 of LAWSON ET AL., supra note 6. 
113 They began this project in GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: 
TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 51-57 (2004), and applied it at length 
to the Necessary and Proper Clause in chapters 2, 3, and 6 of LAWSON ET AL., supra note 6. 
114 LAWSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 6. 
115 Gary Lawson and Guy I. Seidman, Necessity, Propriety, and Reasonableness, in LAWSON ET 
AL., supra note 6, at 120, 120-21. 
116 Robert G. Natelson, The Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in 
LAWSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 84, 85 (“All [the Framers] were men of affairs, public and 
private, and a clear majority were, or had been, practicing lawyers.  Seven of the fifty-five . . .had 
attended London’s Inns of Court.”). 
117 Lawson & Seidman, supra note 115, at 120-21.  
118 See id. at 141. 
119 See id. at 142. 
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These conclusions, in turn, “work hand in hand”120 with Natelson’s private 
agency law conclusions.  Even those Framers who were not lawyers were 
typically actively involved in business, and thus commonly employed, or served 
as, private fiduciaries, for instance in trading their crops.121  Moreover, fiduciary 
relationships were also common within families: prominent men in the eighteenth 
century frequently served as guardians, executors, administrators, and trustees.122  
Thus the Framers were likely very familiar with fiduciary principles, including the 
duties of care, good faith, loyalty, and impartiality, which have not changed 
dramatically between the Framers’ era and our own.123   
In order to determine the reach of these fiduciary duties, the relevant 
principles at the time were those of “principal-and-incident” law, which governed 
the exercise of implied, incidental authority that came along with express 
fiduciary duties enumerated in an authorizing document.124  Common law cases 
contemporary to the constitutional convention, like Gardner v. Baillie125 and 
Howard v. Bailee,126 affirm the interpretation of “necessary and proper”-type 
clauses (in these cases, in a disputed letter of attorney) as grants of incidental 
authority to agents, e.g., to Ms. Bailee’s accountant to administer her husband’s 
estate, limited only by background fiduciary principles.  Thus, here too, the same 
basic implications for the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause are clear: 
the Clause followed similar constructions from the time granting unenumerated 
powers to agents (whether estate administrators, or Congressmen) in order to 
execute the relevant enumerated powers, limited only by background fiduciary 
principles. 
 
4. Framers’ Intent 
 
But what does the evidence from the Constitution’s drafting, as well as the 
subsequent ratification and early congressional debates, suggest about the original 
meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause?  Especially when considered in 
                                                 
120 Id. at 143. 
121 Natelson, supra note 108, at 56. 
122 See id. (“There is reason to believe that people had significantly more exposure to that fiduciary 
service than is true today, both because the shorter life expectancy of the time left far more estates 
to administer per capita and because guardians and executors typically served in teams rather than 
singly.  Certainly, general knowledge of the law was more widely spread than it is today, a one 
can see from the records of the public debates, very often carried on in explicitly legal terms.”). 
123 Id. at 57-60; see also id. at 57 (“A full discussion of contemporaneous fiduciary duties is 
beyond the scope of this book, but in general they were similar to those imposed today.”). 
124 See id. at 60.  
125 (K.B. 1795) 6 T.R. 591, 101 Eng. Rep. 720. 
126 (K.B. 1796) 2 H. Bl. 618, 126 Eng. Rep. 737.  For more on the Baillie cases, see Natelson, 
supra note 108, at 80-82. 
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light of the background principles just discussed, they show the Framers 
attempting to enable Congress to act as reasonably needed to carry out its 
enumerated powers, and to do so as proper fiduciary agents of “the People” 
placed front and center in the Constitution’s preamble. 
 The Committee of Detail’s draft language for what would become the 
Necessary and Proper Clause first referred to a “right to make all Laws necessary 
to carry the foregoing Powers into Execu—.”127  Edmund Randolph, a member of 
the Committee, later confirmed that this language applied the incidental powers 
doctrine, noting that “[t]o be necessary is to be incidental, or, in other words, may 
be denominated the natural means of executing a power.”128  The “and proper” 
language was added to the Necessary and Proper Clause afterward.  Though there 
is no record of the reason, the separate addition does suggest the “proper” piece 
was more than boilerplate redundancy.129    
 Rather, the constitutional ratifying debates suggest that “proper”—and 
“necessary and proper” more broadly—meant to incorporate agency and fiduciary 
law limiting principles on the exercise of congressional power.  The Virginia 
debates offer an especially rich record.  In Virginia, as elsewhere, Antifederalists 
deemed the Necessary and Proper Clause the “Sweeping Clause,” and stoked 
fears that it gave Congress unlimited power.130  The Constitution’s supporters 
responded by noting that the Clause does not create new powers but only makes 
explicit the natural assumption—applying agency principles—that enumerating 
certain powers implies incidental powers to carry out the enumerated ones.131 
                                                 
127 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 44 (Max Farrand, ed., rev. ed. 
1937).  
128 Opinion of Edmund Randolph, Attorney General of the United States, to President Washington 
(Feb. 12, 1791), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE 
UNITED STATES 86, 89 (Matthew St. Clair Clarke & David A. Hall eds., Gales & Seaton 1832); 
see also Opinion of Attorney General No. 2 (Feb. 12, 1791), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE AND 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 89, 90 (“If [the powers to 
incorporate a national bank] be incidental powers, and the conclusion be, that, because some 
incidental powers are expressed, no others are admissible, it would not only be contrary to the 
common forms of construction, but would reduce the present Congress to the feebleness of the old 
one, which could exercise no powers not expressly delegated.”). 
129 Natelson, supra note 116, at 89. 
130 See id. at 94-96. 
131 See, e.g., An Impartial Citizen V, PETERSBURG VA. GAZETTE, Feb. 28, 1788, reprinted in 8 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 431 (John P. Kaminski & 
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988) (“Now, I insist that [Antifederalist] Mr. Mason’s construction on 
this clause is absolutely puerile . . . . When a power is vested anywhere, from the nature of things 
it must be understood to be attended by both other incidental powers as are necessary to give it 
efficacy; for so to say, that a power is given, without the power of enforcing it, is a solecism of 
language.”).  For a view from outside Virginia, see THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 221-22 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Cynthia Brantley Johnson ed., 2004) (“[The Necessary and Proper Clause and the 
Supremacy Clause] have been the source of much virulent invective and petulant declamation 
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Edmund Randolph (who refused to sign the Constitution in Philadelphia, but later 
supported its ratification in Virginia) explained: “The formidable clause does not 
in the least increase the powers of Congress.  It is only inserted for greater 
caution.”132  Madison added: “[W]hat new terrors can arise from this particular 
clause?  It is only a superfluity. . . . [I]t gives no supplementary power.  It only 
enables [Congress] to execute the delegated powers. . . . For when any power is 
given, its delegation necessarily involves authority to make laws to execute it.”133  
 Henry “Light Horse Harry” Lee invoked agency limitations explicitly: 
“[I]f a man delegated certain powers to an agent, it would be an insult upon 
common sense to suppose that the agent could legally transact any business for 
his principal which was not contained in the commission whereby the powers 
were delegated.”134  Though Madison did not refer directly to agency law in his 
retorts to the Antifederalists, his adherence to an agency theory of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause—and government more generally—was made quite clear in the 
ratification debates. As he noted at one point: “[t]he members of the . . . 
government . . . are the agents of, and subordinate to, the people.”135  
 The flip-side of Madison and the Federalists’ vision of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause is that, while the Clause permits only those laws necessary and 
proper to carry out enumerated powers, it thereby permits all laws that an agent 
would properly execute to carry out those powers, in light of background 
fiduciary principles.  As Madison explained in The Federalist: “[n]o axiom is 
more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is 
required, the means are authorized; whenever a general power to do a thing is 
given, every particular power necessary for doing it, is included.”136 
                                                                                                                                     
against the proposed Constitution. . . . [A]nd yet, strange as it may appear, after all this clamor . . . 
it may be affirmed with perfect confidence, that the constitutional operation of the intended 
government would be precisely the same, if these clauses were entirely obliterated, as if they were 
repeated in every article. They are only declaratory of a truth, which would have resulted by 
necessary and unavoidable implication from the very act of constituting a Federal Government, 
and vesting it with certain specific powers.”).   
132 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 206 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]. 
133 Id. at 438; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 322 (James Madison) (Cynthia Brantley 
Johnson ed., 2004) (“Few parts of the Constitution have been assailed with more intemperance 
than [the Necessary and Proper Clause]; yet on a fair investigation of it, no part can appear more 
completely invulnerable.  Without the substance of this power, the whole Constitution would be a 
dead letter.”). 
134 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 132 at 186. 
135 Id. at 306. 
136 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 324 (James Madison) (Cynthia Brantley Johnson ed., 2004); see 
also THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 222 (Alexander Hamilton) (“What is a power, but the ability or 
faculty of doing a thing?  What is the ability to do a thing but the power of employing the means 
necessary to its execution?  What is a LEGISLATIVE power but a power of making LAWS?  
What are the means to execute a LEGISLATIVE power but LAWS?”). 
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 Moreover, in early congresses, this flip-side gained prominence, and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause came to be understood, at least by Federalists, as a 
provision granting Congress broad authority to act in the nation’s best interests to 
carry out its enumerated powers.137  For some Federalists, having any precise link 
to an enumerated power was in fact unnecessary.  Early legislation as important as 
assumption of the states’ debt was passed at least in part by invocation of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, but without an explicit link to an enumerated 
power.138  Madison reasserted the need for an explicit link to an enumerated 
power in the debates over the First National Bank,139 and the more radical reading 
gradually disappeared after Jefferson and the Republicans came to power.140  
What remained—as confirmed in the debate over the Second National Bank—was 
an understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause that saw Congress as an 
empowered, if constitutionally limited, agent of the American people.         
 
B. McCulloch as Defining (But Incomplete) Interpretation 
 
Like Madison and many of the Framers, John Marshall saw government 
through the lens of the agency theory that was a fundamental legal background at 
the time.  “It is the plain dictate of common sense, and the whole political system 
is founded on the idea,” Marshall wrote, “that the departments of government are 
the agents of the nation, and will perform, within their respective spheres, the 
duties assigned to them.”141  This elaboration of an agency theory of government, 
notably, came in the course of defending Marshall’s decision in McCulloch v. 
Maryland, in which the Chief Justice upheld Congress’ power under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to incorporate the Second National Bank.142  
McCulloch drew explicitly on the incidental powers theory from agency 
law.  This may seem natural given that McCulloch’s counsel, the distinguished 
advocate and former U.S. Attorney General, minister to Russia, and U.S. Senator 
                                                 
137 Cf. Joseph M. Lynch, United States v. Comstock and the Necessary and Proper Clause: A 
Concurring, Albeit Unsettling, Opinion 10-18 (Sept. 2011) (unpublished manuscript). 
138 See id. at 12.  But cf. Natelson, supra note 116, at 115-18 (arguing that there was broad 
agreement on the principles underlying the Necessary and Proper Clause, and particularly some 
variation of the incidental powers doctrine, by the time of the congressional debates on the First 
National Bank in 1791). 
139 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 367, 371 (Linda Grant Depauw 
et al. eds. 1972) (statement of Rep. Madison) (“Its meaning must, according to the natural and 
obvious force of the terms and the context, be limited to means necessary to the end, and incident 
to the nature of the specified powers.”); see also Lynch, supra note 137, at 13. 
140 See id. at 17. 
141 John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, July 15, 1819, reprinted 
in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 211 (Gerald Gunther ed. 1969). 
142 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 424 (1819). 
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(among other things), William Pinkney, relied heavily on the theory in his 
argument,143 noting for instance that “[t]he power of erecting corporations is not 
an end of any government; it is a necessary means of accomplishing the ends of 
all governments.  It is an authority inherent in, and incident to, all sovereignty.”144  
Marshall himself explained: “Among the enumerated powers, we do not find that 
of establishing a bank or creating a corporation. But there is no phrase in the 
instrument which, like the articles of confederation, excludes incidental or implied 
powers; and which requires that everything granted shall be expressly and 
minutely described.”145  Rather, Marshall continued: “a government, intrusted 
with such ample powers, on the due execution of which the happiness and 
prosperity of the nation so vitally depends, must also be intrusted with ample 
means for their execution,”146 and the Framers explicitly so entrusted the 
Congress through the Necessary and Proper Clause.147  What is more, the 
“intrust” language affirms precisely the fiduciary understanding of Congress’ role 
that the Framers intended to incorporate through the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.   
Marshall’s reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch has 
since become the classic interpretation of the Clause.  Comstock, of course, has 
forced some rethinking of the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, but it 
is important to emphasize that nothing in Comstock actively undermines 
McCulloch.  In fact, Breyer’s opinion explicitly reaffirms McCulloch, calling 
Marshall’s well-known statement that when “the end be legitimate” and “within 
the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are 
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited . . . are constitutional” 
“language that has come to define the scope of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.”148     
Comstock’s evident approval of McCulloch indicates that the Court’s most 
recent interpretation of the Clause should be read in light of—and be constrained 
by—the McCulloch test, rather than being read as a wholesale replacement for 
                                                 
143 Indeed, it has been argued that, “John Marshall's opinion for the Court in McCulloch is an 
epitome of Pinkney’s speech, stripped of its amplification and soaring rhetoric.”  Stephen M. 
Shapiro, William Pinkney: The Supreme Court’s Greatest Advocate (1999), available at 
http://www.appellate.net/articles/wilpin799.asp.   
144 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 383 (argument of William Pinkney). 
145 Id. at 406. 
146 Id. at 408. 
147 Id. at 411-12 (“But the constitution of the United States has not left the right of congress to 
employ the necessary means, for the execution of the powers conferred on the government, to 
general reasoning.  To its enumeration of powers is added, that of making ‘all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper, for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers 
vested by this constitution, in the government of the United States, or in any department 
thereof.’”). 
148 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421). 
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McCulloch.  As courts and commentators have begun to suggest, Comstock’s five 
factors can be read as elaborations of McCulloch test requirements.  In particular, 
the factors seem to be fleshing out the “means which are appropriate” and 
“plainly adapted” to a given enumerated constitutional end.149  But because the 
Comstock factors are vague, they have so far only added confusion to the means-
end rationality test first established in McCulloch.  What history of federal 
involvement in the area is “long” enough?  What are sufficiently “sound reasons” 
to legislate?  What makes a statute sufficiently “narrow in scope”? 
 The ambiguity inherent in the Comstock factors therefore brings greater 
attention to the underlying, enduring puzzle of the Necessary and Proper Clause: 
what does it mean for the fit between legislated means and enumerated end to be 
reasonable?  As noted earlier, this question has become even more difficult in the 
aftermath of Comstock because Comstock explicitly rejected the requirement of a 
one-step removal limit between the chosen means and an enumerated 
constitutional end.150  And so it is to this question that the Article now turns. 
 
C. Three Readings of the Necessary and Proper Clause After 
Comstock 
 
This Section will focus on the deeper puzzle of Comstock left open since 
McCulloch: what does it really mean for a legislated means to be “plainly 
adapted” and “appropriate” for an enumerated end?151  At the same time, the 
Section will attempt to shed some additional light on Comstock’s five 
considerations, because—though they might not map on perfectly to a means-end 
fit test—the considerations can be read to inform such a test.    
In canvassing the range of possible means-end tests, this Section first 
evaluates two more extreme positions, either a rational basis test with substantial 
“bite” or an approach through which the judiciary largely abandons the field, and 
then explores possible intermediate positions.  It ultimately concludes that an 
intermediate position informed by the Necessary and Proper Clause’s fiduciary 
history—particularly a test asking whether Congress is acting as a proper 
fiduciary of the American people within the context of its enumerated powers—is 
the best way to bring meaning and clarity to the Clause after Comstock.   
                                                 
149 See, e.g., United States v. Kebodeaux, 634 F.3d 137, 143 (5th Cir. 2011) (explaining that 
Comstock’s first and third factors are just proxies for considering whether a statute is reasonably 
adapted to an enumerated end); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 393 (D. Mass. 
2010) (stating that the history factor is “only a proxy to determine ‘the reasonableness of the 
relation between the new statute and pre-existing federal interests’”); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 250 (D. Mass. 2010) (same). 
150 See supra text accompanying notes 44-46. 
151 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. 
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1. “Rational Basis with Bite” 
 
The most aggressive reasonable interpretation of the requirement of a 
rational relationship between legislated means and constitutional ends is some 
form of rational basis test with bite, i.e., a test that is likely to find some non-
trivial range of congressional legislation unconstitutional under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.  While the Clause post-Comstock may not require that the 
connection between legislated means and enumerated end be only one-step 
removed, that does not necessarily mean the connection between means and ends 
need not be a significant one.  Especially if we read Comstock’s five factors 
(which lend insight into whether a means really is rational) more like a test in 
which all or most of the considerations should be met for a statute to be 
constitutional, as Justice Thomas’ dissent,152 Justice Alito and Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrences,153 and some lower courts154 have indicated the factors might be 
read, we are left with a demanding constitutionality standard. 
 A rigorous rational basis test requiring all five of Breyer’s factors to be 
satisfied would provide some degree of predictability because there would be five 
specific prongs to be met.  But it still would not be especially clear, given the 
vagueness inherent in the various prongs.  Thus it might be useful to draw 
analogies from other contexts in which rational basis tests have been given 
substantial bite.  The most obvious candidate is the rational basis with bite test 
from the equal protection context, applied to certain classes not entitled to strict or 
even intermediate scrutiny, but which are nevertheless subject to some level of 
implicitly heightened judicial review.155  Such an implicitly heightened standard 
could be applied to require an active showing of rationality in the relationship 
between a legislated means and an enumerated end, perhaps as demonstrated 
through fit within Congress’ broad legislative powers, the history of federal 
involvement in the area, the sound reasons for the statute, the statute’s 
accommodation of state interests, and the statute’s narrow scope.  Yet when to 
actually apply the bite in this test is notoriously uncertain in the Equal Protection 
                                                 
152 See supra text accompanying note 60. 
153 See supra Section I.b (noting the concurrences’ concerns about the ambiguity of the majority’s 
five-factor approach). 
154 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 88. 
155 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that a state constitutional amendment 
preventing any municipality from recognizing homosexuals as a protected class failed rational 
basis review); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that 
a special use permit requirement for a group home for mentally disabled individuals failed rational 
basis review). 
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context.156  And it would likely be equally uncertain when the bite should be 
applied to hold that Comstock’s five factors are not met sufficiently to establish a 
true rational relationship between means and enumerated end.  
 Another context in which rational-basis-type tests have been given 
significant bite is in the “hard look” approach to the “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard for striking down administrative rulemaking.157  Especially given recent 
research suggesting that the history of the Necessary and Proper Clause may have 
been influenced in part by administrative law reasonableness principles that led 
directly to the arbitrary and capricious standard,158 looking to this jurisprudence 
may seem appropriate.  By doing so, we might analogize the legislating Congress 
to the rulemaking agency, and suggest that, like an agency subject to hard look 
review, Congress should be held to a standard of substantive rationality in the 
relationship of its legislation with enumerated constitutional ends, again perhaps 
setting the Comstock factors as requisite benchmarks for such substantive 
rationality.  But when hard look review is merited, and how exactly to apply it, 
may be as uncertain as in the case of equal protection’s rational basis with bite 
test.159     
Thus, even using equal protection or administrative law analogies and the 
five Comstock prongs as a guide, without more certainty as to the content of those 
prongs, it would be hard to apply a rational basis with bite test in the Necessary 
and Proper context consistently. Nor, even if it did draw upon administrative 
“reasonableness” principles, does the approach directly incorporate the central 
history of the Necessary and Proper Clause in fiduciary principles.  And, probably 
most importantly, such a stringent approach does not fit well with the most 
                                                 
156 See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A 
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 46 (1972) (indicating that the rational 
basis with bite model “is relatively simple to describe, but the description may obscure difficulties 
in its application”); Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the 
Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications 
Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2814 (describing rational basis with bite 
as a “heretofore elusive, undefined, and controversial” standard of review). 
157 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (holding that modification of motor vehicle standard was 
arbitrary and capricious without a satisfactory, rational reason); National Tire Dealers & 
Retreaders Ass’n, Inc. v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that a tire labeling 
regulation was arbitrary and capricious because there was no substantial relationship between the 
regulation and the statutory ends). 
158 See supra text accompanying notes 115-119; see also Lawson & Seidman, supra note 115.  
159 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL & PETER M. SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 537-38 (6th ed. 2009) (considering confusion over 
procedural vs. substantive standards in Brinegar, difficulty distinguishing Brinegar from another 
case in which a regulation was upheld, and whether arbitrary and capricious review is really less 
demanding than substantial evidence review). 
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plausible reading of Comstock.  As discussed above, Breyer’s five 
“considerations” are to be “taken together,”160 an approach that seems flexible, 
especially given the Justice’s usual pragmatic and deferential perspective.161  
 
2. Abandon the Field 
 
Given the problems with a rigorous rational basis with bite approach, one 
might think that what Comstock actually suggests is that the courts should 
essentially abandon the field of policing exercises of Congress’ legislative 
authority.  After all, the post-sentence civil commitment statute upheld in 
Comstock is a striking exercise of congressional power.  If Comstock’s 
considerations are read only as considerations and not as a test, as seems to have 
been Breyer’s intention,162 and we read strongly Breyer’s point that there is no 
limit to the number of steps of logical separation between means and ends, the 
standard for upholding legislation as reasonable can become effectively a rubber-
stamp.  Under this approach, as long as some argument can be made that there is a 
connection between legislated means and enumerated end, courts should defer to 
Congress.  
This perspective is analogous to Justice Souter’s dissent in United States v. 
Lopez, in which he argued that the Commerce Clause “substantial effects” 
jurisprudence had reached a point where the Court had essentially abandoned the 
field, as there were no longer manageable standards to apply in determining 
whether a given law “substantially affects” interstate commerce.163  For Souter, 
the Court had been right, since the “switch in time” in 1937,164 to “defer to what is 
often a merely implicit congressional judgment that its regulation addresses a 
subject substantially affecting commerce ‘if there is any rational basis for such a 
finding.’”165  The reason?  Judicial restraint.  “In judicial review under the 
Commerce Clause,” Souter explained, “it reflects our respect for the institutional 
competence of the Congress on a subject expressly assigned to it by the 
                                                 
160 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010). 
161 See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text. 
162 See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
163 See 514 U.S. 549, 603 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
164 See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National 
Labor Relations Act’s regulation of a steel corporation’s labor practices, as legislation 
“substantially affecting” interstate commerce). 
165 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 
U.S. 264, 276 (1981); Presault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990)).  Souter also warned: “The modern 
respect for the competence and primacy of Congress in matters affecting commerce developed 
only after one of this Court's most chastening experiences, when it perforce repudiated an earlier 
and untenably expansive conception of judicial review in derogation of congressional commerce 
power.”  Id. at 604. 
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Constitution and our appreciation of the legitimacy that comes from Congress’ 
political accountability in dealing with matters open to a wide range of possible 
choices.”166  Souter’s theory, applicable to similar determinations outside the 
Commerce Clause context, may seem to fit well with Breyer’s deferential 
Necessary and Proper Clause approach, seen in Comstock and in his separate 
dissent in Lopez,167 among other places.   
But even Souter recognized the need for at least some rational basis for the 
relationship between legislation and interstate commerce, and allowing any 
congressional basis but the patently absurd to be deemed a rational fit between 
legislated means and enumerated end abandons almost all of the judiciary’s role 
in interpreting the Necessary and Proper Clause, weakening the separation of 
powers function of judicial review in this context.  Moreover, the fact that Justice 
Breyer expended so much effort elaborating considerations to justify his 
conclusion in Comstock may suggest that courts’ Necessary and Proper Clause 
means-end fit analysis should be a serious one.  As Justice Alito’s Comstock 
concurrence warned: “The Necessary and Proper Clause does not give Congress 
carte blanche.  Although the term ‘necessary’ does not mean ‘absolutely 
necessary’ or indispensable, the term requires an ‘appropriate’ link between a 
power conferred by the Constitution and the law enacted by Congress.”168 
 
3. An Intermediate Option 
 
Given the problems with both a very weak and a very strong reading of the 
requisite fit between legislated means and enumerated end under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, it may be most appropriate to pursue an intermediate reading.  
Such a middle ground, more serious than the virtual blank check of the “abandon 
the field” approach and yet more deferential than the “rational basis with bite” 
approach, would almost certainly be more loyal to the majority’s moderate and 
pragmatic approach implicit in Comstock.  One way to give content to such an 
intermediate position is to look to the newly clarified history of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause,169 to craft a test that reflects original meaning. 
Applying the history of the Necessary and Proper Clause in agency and 
fiduciary principles to design a means-end rationality test does not inevitably lead 
                                                 
166 Id.  
167 Id. at 616-17 (“Courts must give Congress a degree of leeway in determining the existence of a 
significant factual connection between the regulated activity and interstate commerce—both 
because the Constitution delegates the commerce power directly to Congress and because the 
determination requires an empirical judgment of a kind that a legislature is more likely than a 
court to make with accuracy.”). 
168 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1970 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
169 See supra Section III.a. 
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to one particular test.  The precise test emerging from the history depends on the 
level of generality from which the history is approached.  A test at a lower level 
of generality might ask the question: is the means of legislation by the agent 
(Congress) of the kind the principal (the American people), if asked, would have 
approved in advance as a “necessary and proper” exercise of the agent’s 
enumerated powers?170  This test emerges from the incidental powers doctrine 
that was a key source for the Necessary and Proper Clause,171 as it asks whether 
the Congress is properly legislating only in a manner incidental to its enumerated 
powers.  There are, however, serious problems with such an approach.  First, we 
must ask: which “American people” do we have in mind?  If we are talking about 
Americans at the time of the founding, they probably would have approved of 
almost none of the legislated means later permitted, e.g., under the Commerce 
Clause, because there was at the time a very strong skepticism of central 
government power.172  Even if we are talking about the American people in 
contemporary perspective, as may be more reasonable,173 how do we know what 
they would have approved in advance?  Though we might be confident that most 
contemporary Americans would approve a broader range of legislation than 
would Americans in the Founding generation, the “principal” is too diffuse to be 
confident about its preferences, particularly in any borderline situation.  Thus, the 
test would fail in all the difficult cases—and so could hardly be considered 
judicially manageable. 
As an alternative, a test drawing on the same history but framed from a 
higher level of generality could ask, from an objective, contemporary perspective, 
whether the legislative means chosen by Congress properly follows from an 
enumerated power, as judged by a determination of whether Congress is acting as 
a proper fiduciary of the American people.  That is, is the Congress carrying out 
its fiduciary duties, within the context of its enumerated powers?  This 
approach—which this Article calls a modern fiduciary theory of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause—draws directly on the history of the Clause in fiduciary and 
agency law, and, as the next Part will show, uses that history to give content to a 
                                                 
170 Cf. Natelson, supra note 108, at 82-83. 
171 See id. 
172 See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 559 
(“Yet amidst all of the jumble of explanations presented during the ratification debates there was 
one that the Federalists repeatedly came back to: the need to distribute and separate mistrusted 
government power.”). 
173 It is worth noting here that even arch-originalist Justice Scalia has implied that original intent 
must be adaptable as applied to new technology and contexts.  See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) (Scalia, J.) (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy 
secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of 
technology.”). 
Modern Fiduciary Theory 
 
 
    37
judicially manageable modern test that follows from Comstock, and may solve 
both puzzles embedded in that decision. 
  
 
IV. A MODERN FIDUCIARY THEORY OF THE NECESSARY & PROPER CLAUSE 
 
This Part elaborates the final means-end test introduced in the previous 
Part: the modern fiduciary theory of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  It argues, 
first, that the modern fiduciary theory is a natural elaboration of the Comstock 
opinion that clarifies both puzzles of that opinion, the deeper puzzle of what 
means-end fit should be required under the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the 
puzzle on the surface of the opinion as to how to interpret Breyer’s five 
considerations.  It does so by assuming adherence to Congress’ fiduciary duties as 
agents of the American people as the requirement for a reasonable fit between 
legislated means and constitutional ends, and reading the five considerations as 
non-binding, pragmatic factors for interpreting Congress’ fiduciary duties.   
This Part further argues that the modern fiduciary theory has at least two 
other advantages: it presents an appropriate middle ground between the two 
extremes laid out in Part III (an aggressive rational basis with bite test on the one 
hand, and abandoning the field of judicial enforcement on the other).  Moreover, 
the modern test is adaptable over time, yet at the same time rooted in the original 
principles underlying the Necessary and Proper Clause.  While manageability 
might remain a challenge under the modern fiduciary theory, it should be less of a 
problem than under other approaches because well-developed existing fiduciary 
principles provide ample guidance.  A case study of the modern fiduciary theory 
applied to the PPACA—which almost certainly would be held constitutional 
under the modern fiduciary theory—demonstrates how the test can be applied in a 
manageable, straightforward way, finally bringing meaning back to the Necessary 
and Proper Clause. 
 
A. The Test 
 
In order to apply the modern fiduciary theory and answer the question of 
whether Congress is carrying out its fiduciary duties to the American people, 
within the context of its enumerated powers, it is important to clarify what 
fiduciary duties are applicable.  This Section begins by reviewing the fiduciary 
duties the Framers of the Necessary and Proper Clause recognized, and proceeds 
to show that overlapping duties emerge from Comstock’s five considerations.  As 
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suggested in the historical analysis above,174 the Constitution at large “should be 
read through a fiduciary lens” because “[a] central purpose of the document was 
to adopt for America a fiduciary government whose conduct would mimic that of 
the private-law fiduciary,” in honoring duties to “exercise reasonable care, remain 
loyal to the public interest, [and] exercise . . . power in a reasonably impartial 
manner.”175  This vision, shared by Whigs and many Tories, had roots in classical 
political—both republican and social compact—theory.176 The language of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause in particular was evocative of this fiduciary vision.  
As such, the means-end rationality test under the Clause should be read to 
incorporate the fiduciary duties widely accepted at the time,177 including 
reasonable impartiality, loyalty, good faith, care, and remaining within 
authority.178 
 Each of these duties can also be understood to emerge from the 
considerations applied in Comstock.  The duty to remain within authority is 
incorporated in the first and second Comstock considerations.  According to the 
first consideration, Congress has “broad authority to enact legislation . . . ‘based 
on one or more’” enumerated power(s).179  The connection of this factor to the 
duty to remain within authority is self-evident: legislating only based on 
enumerated powers is the one fundamental limitation of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, and the fundamental requirement for Congress to remain within the 
constitutional authority it was granted.  Under Comstock’s second consideration, 
Congress should consider the history of federal involvement in an arena, to help 
                                                 
174 See supra Section III.a. 
175 Natelson, supra note 108, at 52-53.  For a modern fiduciary theory of government, see Fox-
Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, supra note 8. 
176 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (Thomas I. Cook ed., 
1947) (1690) (“The power of assembling and dismissing the legislative, placed in the executive, 
gives not the executive a superiority over it, but is a fiduciary trust for the safety of the people        
. . . .”); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 168 (Rose M. Harrington trans., 
Knickerbocker Press 1893) (1762) (“In all true democracies, the magistracy is not an advantage, 
but an onerous duty . . . .”); see also Natelson, supra note 108, at 53-55 (noting numerous 
influences on the Founders viewing government as a fiduciary or trust-based relationship, and the 
resulting trust-based understanding of the Founders’ role).  
177 See Natelson, supra note 108, at 57-60.  As noted, supra note 123 and accompanying text, the 
law of fiduciary duties has not changed dramatically since the Founding.  
178 See Natelson, supra note 108, at 119.  It is worth emphasizing here that these fiduciary duties, 
like the Comstock decision itself, should be understood in a manner deferential to the agent, i.e., 
Congress.  The modern fiduciary theory assumes a business judgment rule-type presumption, as 
for corporate fiduciaries, and the duty of care, for instance, should not be understood to adopt the 
more aggressive (and largely discredited) standard of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 
1985).  For critiques of Van Gorkom, see, for example, Daniel Fischel, The Business Judgment 
Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985) (calling the decision “one of the 
worst . . . in the history of corporate law.”). 
179 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000)). 
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determine “the reasonableness of the relation between the new statute and pre-
existing federal interests.”180  Here too, Congress is being expected to act only 
within its authority, as reflected in past practice, i.e., previous spheres of activity 
deemed appropriate for federal legislation. 
The other Comstock considerations can also be read to reflect some 
combination of fiduciary duties owed by Congress.  Narrowness of scope, for 
instance, reflects the duty of care, as due care requires reasonably careful, non-
negligent drafting.  The narrow scope factor also embodies the duty to remain 
within authority, as the legislation must be reasonably narrowly tailored to an 
enumerated power.  The accommodation of state interests factor reflects care in 
avoiding inappropriate intrusion in areas of state concern, and good faith and 
impartiality in Congress’ role as stewards of a federal system.   
Finally, Comstock’s sound reasons for enactment factor is explicitly 
described in fiduciary terms.181  Duties of care, loyalty, good faith, and 
impartiality are all inherent in the requirement that legislation be based on sound 
reasons “in light of the Government’s custodial interest in safeguarding the 
public.”182  As the Court explains in discussing the sound reasons for enactment 
of § 4248, “at common law, one ‘who takes charge of a third person’ is ‘under a 
duty to exercise reasonable care.’”183  Implicit in this recognition is a linked 
appreciation that one—including Congress—“taking charge” as a fiduciary is also 




The modern fiduciary theory is a natural reading of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause post-Comstock, as confirmed by the fit between Comstock’s factors 
and traditional fiduciary duties, and the content these duties provide to a test of 
means-end fit.  But the modern fiduciary reading has two other important 
benefits: first, its effective moderation between the two extremes of a test with 
substantial “bite” and abandoning the field; and, second, its flexibility over time, 
while being rooted in historical principles on which the Necessary and Proper 
Clause was based.  As for moderation, the modern fiduciary theory balances 
separation of powers concerns that demand that courts not give up having any real 
role in interpreting means-ends fit under the Necessary and Proper Clause,184 with 
                                                 
180 Id. at 1958. 
181 See id. at 1961-62, 1965.  The context is linked to Congress’ role under § 4248 as custodian of 
federal prisoners, but the language is sweeping enough to apply more broadly.  See id.    
182 Id. at 1965. 
183 Id. at 1961 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1963-1964)). 
184 The Court would have to give up such a role if the “abandon the field” alternative were applied.  
See supra Subsection III.c.ii. 
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due deference to Congress,185 which—as a whole—almost certainly is most often 
operating with loyalty and good faith, and generally is also operating with care 
and impartiality. 
 As for flexibility over time, the modern fiduciary theory does not suffer 
the flaws inherent in the alternative lower level of generality test discussed in Part 
III that asks whether the means of legislation by Congress is of the kind the 
American people, if asked, would have approved in advance.186  First, the modern 
fiduciary theory, asking whether Congress is, today, objectively acting within its 
fiduciary duties, does not require a nearly impossible historical inquiry into how 
any bill would have been perceived by Americans at the time of the Founding.  
(Nor does it require an almost-as-impractical inquiry into whether modern 
Americans, overall, would have approved a given law in advance.)  Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, the modern fiduciary theory is not limited by the 
relatively narrow scope for federal legislation citizens of the Founding generation 
would have recognized.  What has been deemed a reasonable exercise of 
congressional power has expanded over time.187  The modern fiduciary theory is 
able to adjust for this in a dynamic way, while remaining true to the roots of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause in fiduciary principles.188  In doing so, the modern 
fiduciary theory allows the Clause to uphold, in Chief Justice Marshall’s words 
from McCulloch (reiterated at the conclusion of Comstock), “a constitution 
intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the 




                                                 
185 Congress would be denied this deference under an alternate test with too much bite.  See supra 
Subsection III.c.i. 
186 See supra notes 170-171 and accompanying text. 
187 This is especially evident in the Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 
545 U.S. 1 (2005); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. 
Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 
(1937).  But see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549 (1995). 
188 It is worth noting that this approach is roughly in line with Jack Balkin’s “living originalism,” 
which recognizes that the Constitution is a living document, but attempts to retain fidelity to the 
original meaning of constitutional text and principle.  See BALKIN, supra note 7, at 3.    
189 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1965 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819)).  Justice Breyer is a leading advocate of such a dynamic understanding 
of the Constitution. See, e.g., BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 35, at 25 (indicating that his 
book is meant to “help[] interpret the Constitution—in a way that helps to resolve problems 
related to modern government”). 
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One weakness of the modern fiduciary theory is that it does not 
completely solve the judicial manageability problems currently plaguing the 
Necessary and Proper Clause means-end rationality analysis.  How exactly does 
one know when Congress is carrying out its fiduciary duties to the American 
people, and when it is not?  There will always be a judgment call inherent in 
answering this question (and probably in applying any alternative standard, unless 
the judiciary “abandons the field”).   
But an advantage of the theory proposed here is that agency and corporate 
law principles understood by the Framers themselves provide a reference guide 
for interpreting fiduciary duties.  The alternate test asking what exercises of 
Congress’ legislative power would have been approved in advance will always be 
confounded by the conflicting preferences of the American people doing the 
approving.190  Other rationality standards like rational basis with bite and hard 
look arbitrary and capricious review have also been critiqued for their 
amorphousness.191  In contrast, the modern fiduciary theory allows judges to look 
to a rich history of fiduciary-based thinking, including a common law 
jurisprudence that remains similar today to the way it looked in the Framers’ 
era.192 
 
B. Case Study: The Affordable Care Act 
 
Before concluding, it will be useful to offer a case study of how the 
modern fiduciary theory might be applied in practice.  There is no more pressing 
issue to which the theory might be applied than the debate on the constitutionality 
of the PPACA’s individual mandate.  It is important to note at the outset that the 
constitutionality of the mandate may not ride so much on the Necessary and 
Proper Clause as the Commerce Clause,193 or at least in the case currently before 
the Court, preliminary jurisdictional questions under the Anti-Injunction Act.194  
                                                 
190 See supra Subsection III.c.iii. 
191 See supra notes 156 & 159 and accompanying text. 
192 See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
193 See, e.g., Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, No. 6:10-cv-00015-nkm, 2010 WL 4860299, at *11 (W.D. 
Va. Nov. 30, 2010) (“Because I find that the employer and individual coverage provisions are 
within Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause, it is unnecessary to consider whether the 
provisions would be constitutional exercises of power pursuant to the General Welfare Clause or 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.”). 
194 The Fourth Circuit and Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent in the D.C. Circuit focus on the Anti-
Injunction Act as a bar to suit challenging the individual mandate before it has taken effect.  
Seven-Sky v. Holder, No. 11-5047, 2011 WL 5378319, at *17-18 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 8, 2011) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting as to jurisdiction); Liberty University v. Geithner, No. 10-2347, 2011 
WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011); see also supra note 84 (listing PPACA cases in the lower 
courts that largely avoided Necessary and Proper Clause analysis).   
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And even if the Necessary and Proper Clause is the focus of analysis, some have 
argued that regulation of “inactivity” (i.e., a decision not to buy healthcare) is an 
unconstitutional end,195 such that a court need not even reach analysis of the 
means-end fit.  But, to many, including this author, “the constitutionality of the 
‘end’—that is, the Act’s insurer regulations—is both clear and unchallenged.”196  
The Supreme Court has recognized insurance as commercial activity,197 and even 
Judge Vinson, in striking down the individual mandate, recognized “the ‘end’ of 
regulating the health care insurance industry . . . is clearly legitimate and within 
the scope of the constitution.”198  There is, moreover, no precedent for a 
fundamental activity-inactivity distinction in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.199   
What is somewhat more complicated is whether there is sufficient 
rationality in the relationship between means (i.e., the individual mandate) and 
end (i.e., regulation of commerce).  To answer this question, the modern fiduciary 
theory brings to bear a new and valuable toolset.  Applying this approach, the 
critical question is whether Congress was acting as a proper fiduciary of the 
American people, within the context of its enumerated powers (here, the 
commerce power), in enacting the individual mandate.  First, did Congress remain 
within its authority?  If regulating health insurance is within the Commerce 
Clause power, as is generally assumed, it would certainly seem that Congress did 
so remain.200  But did Congress exercise due care, and fulfill its duties of loyalty, 
                                                 
195 See, e.g., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 771-72 (“[T]he 
Commonwealth argues that requiring an otherwise unwilling individual to purchase a good or 
service from a private vendor is beyond the boundaries of congressional Commerce Clause 
power.”), vacated, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011). 
196 See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 
3519178, at *102 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011) (Marcus, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
see also Koppelman, supra note 5, at 3 (describing the “obvious constitutionality” of the mandate 
under the Commerce Clause). 
197 Indeed, it has noted that “[p]erhaps no modern commercial enterprise directly affects so many 
persons in all walks of life as does the insurance business.”  United States v. Se. Underwriters 
Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 540 (1944). 
198 Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1298 
(N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011). 
199 See Koppelman, supra note 5, at 6. 
200 For a historically rooted analysis that reaches a different conclusion, see Lawson & Kopel, 
supra note 5.  See also Brief of Authors of The Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause (Gary 
Lawson, Robert G. Natelson & Guy Seidman) and the Independence Institute as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Appellees, Urging Affirmance, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 
11-11021 (11th Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Authors Brief].  Lawson and Kopel’s essay and Lawson 
and his fellow amici’s brief argue that incidental powers must be “subordinate” to or “less worthy” 
than enumerated powers and “[t]he power to compel private persons to engage in commercial 
transactions with other private persons is not an incidental power” under this standard.  Lawson & 
Kopel, supra note 5, at 267, 279-80; see also Authors Brief, supra, at 14.  Rather, “[t]he power to 
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good faith, and impartiality?  Loyalty and good faith seem easy.  If there were 
evidence of self-dealing or bad faith among members of Congress passing the 
PPACA, the many opponents of the law would almost certainly have broadcast it.  
Similarly, there is no evidence the individual mandate was not carefully designed 
to effectively reform the healthcare insurance market, and assure that all 
Americans were covered.   
The one fiduciary duty that might be open to some question is the duty of 
impartiality.  Naturally, some “principals,” e.g., older, less healthy Americans, 
benefit from the mandated coverage more than others, at least in the short term.  
But in the longer term, and in a broader sense, the individual mandate is in the 
best interests of all Americans, each of whom benefits from a system that 
functions effectively and covers them all through their own old age and declining 
health.  Further, Congress plainly did not intend any favoritism in enacting the 
mandate.201   
In the end, then, the modern fiduciary approach leaves no question that the 
individual mandate is a rational means for carrying out Congress’ enumerated end 
                                                                                                                                     
compel the purchase of a product is as great or greater than the power to regulate voluntary 
commerce.”  Authors Brief, supra, at xiii.  By Lawson and Kopel’s own admission, however, 
these interpretive conclusions do not necessarily follow from the broader historical project in 
LAWSON ET AL., supra note 6.  See Lawson & Kopel, supra note 5, at 270 (“[W]e do not claim that 
all of the book’s authors would necessarily endorse all of the modern uses that we make of their 
purely originalist research.”).  Indeed, anyone who read the Necessary and Proper Clause in the 
dynamic manner assumed in this Article would not feel limited by the narrow eighteenth century 
understanding of what powers can be “incidental” that is relied upon by Lawson.  If, for example, 
criminalizing drugs grown in one’s backyard for personal consumption can be “incidental” to the 
Commerce Clause power today, see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), it seems unreasonable 
to say imposing a penalty for not purchasing health insurance (and thereby contributing to a 
breakdown in the national health insurance system) cannot be incidental.  Andrew Koppelman 
adds, in a response to Lawson and Kopel, that Lawson and Kopel’s reading of what is 
“subordinate” is “obscure even on [its] own terms.”  “It is mysterious,” Koppelman explains, 
“how we are to know whether the power to impose a penalty for going without health insurance is 
less ‘dignified’ or ‘worthy’ than the power to regulate interstate commerce.”  Andrew Koppelman, 
Bad News for Everybody: Lawson and Kopel on Healthcare Reform and Originalism, 121 YALE 
L.J. ONLINE 515, 515 (forthcoming 2012). 
201 Gary Lawson and David Kopel imply that the individual mandate breaches the duty of 
impartiality, because it “compels transactions with a favored oligopoly of insurance companies.”  
Lawson & Kopel, supra note 5, at 267; see also Authors Brief, supra note 200, at 27-30.  But any 
such implication is inapplicable under the modern fiduciary theory because the modern theory 
asks whether Congress is being a proper fiduciary of the American people, not insurance 
companies.  And the American people overall are treated impartially under the individual 
mandate, even if insurance companies may not be.  Even if Lawson and Kopel were read also to 
assume that the individual mandate breached a duty of impartiality to the American people, as 
Andrew Koppelman writes in response to Lawson and Kopel, in fact, “Congress is trying to make 
sure that everyone equally has access to adequate and affordable health care.  Lawson and Kopel 
have not explained why that is not ‘to treat them all fairly.’”  Koppelman, supra note 200, at 521.  
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of regulating commerce.  As such, Comstock, read in light of the modern fiduciary 
theory and the deferential approach that almost certainly inspired its 
considerations, need pose no basic challenge to the individual mandate.  Congress 
was acting within its authority and with impartiality, loyalty, good faith, and care 
in enacting the law, which addresses a national crisis with a very substantial effect 





This Article began with two puzzles emerging from the Comstock 
decision.  The first—what to make of the Justice Breyer’s five “considerations” in 
that case moving forward—proved relatively simple.  In light of Justice Breyer’s 
usual pragmatic and deferential approach, there is no reason to read his five 
considerations in Comstock as any more than precisely what he calls them: 
considerations.  They are not meant to constrain, but to explain. 
Yet in attempting to make sense of Comstock, the Article identified a 
deeper puzzle of the Necessary and Proper Clause, bubbling below the surface 
since McCulloch, and reemerging in Comstock itself: when any given legislative 
act should be understood to follow reasonably from an enumerated constitutional 
power.  The solution to this puzzle was buried somewhat deeper, in the historical 
roots of the Necessary and Proper Clause in the fiduciary theory that was 
pervasive in the world of the Framers.  The Article has shown that this original 
meaning can give content to a means-end test that follows logically from 
Comstock and is at the same time manageable, moderate, and modern—that is, 
informed by original meaning, but dynamic enough not to be unduly weighed 
down by it.  In doing so, the Article has attempted to protect and adapt a Clause 
“without the substance of [which],” in Madison’s words, “the whole constitution 
would be a dead letter.”202 
 
                                                 
202 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 322 (James Madison) (Cynthia Brantley Johnson ed., 2004). 
